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An economic and policy analysis unit is being added to Sequence 2.

FOREWORD
This second edition of Sequence 2 Curriculum Statement is
faithful to the purpose of the first statement in 1975 to present in
one place an overview of national policies and programs which deal
with overriding national problems. In this area, it is difficult to keep
current with the rush of events because of changing contextual
conditions, the extension of goals, and the revision of programs to
benefit from experience in program administration. The authors of
the curriculum statement for Sequence 2 have made a notable
effort to do so, we believe, with considerable success. The reader
must realize, however, that although the curriculum statement
provides a guide in broad outline identifying basic problems, significant issues, and trends in program development, it is up to the
reader to fill in many details as changes occur.
Dr. DeWitt C. Armstrong III, Brig. Gen., U.S. Army (Ret.),
who is a veteran of strategic planning assignments with the Departments of the Army, Defense, and State, as well as numerous
military commands in Europe, Asia, and the United States, has
added new material to Unit 1. Dr. Herbert C. Morton, co-author of
the most widely read of all Brookings books, An Introduction to
Economic Reasoning, former Associate Commissioner in the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, and currently Director of Public Affairs
at Resources for the Future, has replaced William S. Warne as the
author of Unit 2, and has given increased attention to the mysteries
and intractabilities of controlling the economy. Richard L. Seggel,
currently Program Operations Officer in the National Institute of
Medicine, National Academy of Science, a life-long student of
national social policy, saw much of it from the inside, as an administrator for a third of a century in Federal social policy agencies,
including the U.S. Public Health Service, the National Institutes of
Health (as Associate Director for Administration), and HEW
(Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health Policy Implementation).
His extensive revision of Unit 3 provides a comprehensive review
of the evolution of national social policies over half a century of
dramatic advances as well as some discouraging disappointments.
The curriculum statement for Sequence 2 reflects the richness, variety, and complexity of national efforts to deal with imperative problems. It is a story of mingled triumphs, limited successes, and some misfires. The curriculum statement requires

careful reading and thoughtful reflection. Participants who give it
this attention will find that they have a solid base on which to build
in their additional required reading, and in increasing their comprehensions of this dynamic and demanding area of public administration.
The task of the three authors in updating the curriculum
statement was not easy, and we are greatly indebted to them for
their careful review and analysis of events from an experiencebased perspective.
-John M. Clarke, Director
Center for the Study of Administration
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THE NATURE AND PURPOSE
OF THE SEQUENCE
Policies. which are guidelines by which governments move to
achieve, or to aid in the achievement of society·s goals, are obviously of great concern to administrators; for administrators are
necessarily major contributors to the formulation of policy, and
they bear the burden of the action to carry out policies. Without
their contribution to the formulation process, policies are likely to
be ill conceived for execution; and unless there is feedback of
experience in execution into the process of policy refinement, the
emerging needs of society may be too long ignored, leading to
stagnation rather than progress in attaining goals.
The Focus of The Policy Formulator Sequence
The functions of government are now so extensive and the
programs by which the functions are sought to be achieved are so
varied and numerous, that it baffles the mind to comprehend them
all. Each has its purpose. its proponents. and its clienteles. as well
as its authority, organization, procedures, personnel and funds. It
is obviously not possible in any course in public administration to
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survey them all, let alone to study them intensively. The purpo~~
1
this sequence is rather to consider three program areas on "!' ~
especial public and governmental attention is centered m t e
. u"mpera1980's. In these areas there are high priority goals, po licy 1
•
tives," so to speak. In these areas the public administrator's role m
contributing to policy formulation and development must ~e
played fully and efficiently, if there is to be adequate progre~s 10
developing feasible action programs which can deal effecuvely
with urgent problems.

The Stages ofAction
Stages in governmental action may be noted, among them: the
identification of difficulties and danger, or problems and needs
which are of social consequence; the arousing of public concern;
the fixing and/or clarification of goals; the development of ideas for
remedial action; sorting out alternatives; determining intermediate
objectives and selecting means to reach the ultimate goals; devising action programs-methods, organization, manpower; assigning powers and allocating resources; and the drive to execute plans
and programs feeding back into revisions the lessons of operating
experience. There is no stage at which the administrator cannot
make a useful .. input," directly or indirectly, although it must more
often than not be advisory, informative, and persuasive rather than
authoritative, especially in the early stages of policy formulation.
But since so much depends upon the administrator's "input," he
must find ways of making it effectively without interfering with the
contribution of other and perhaps more obvious contributors to
public policy.
Goals are Important
Not much happens in public affairs until society's goals are
established and until there is public commitment to them, but the
experienced administrator knows that the means, methods, and
style ofaction are just as important as the goals and objectives, and
that goals cannot be obtained until efficient means of action are
found, or invented. Despite centuries of concern with public
health, Western civilization made little or no progress in controlling
disease until the 19th Century bacteriologists broke through the
ignorance barrier to determine the nature and cause of disease.
Since then progress has been phenomenal, but the possibility of
11
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effective action is still limited by the extent of knowledge of
causes, and by the availability of effective means. In this, as in
other fields of social need and concern, governments have to know
what they are doing to be effective.
Some goals of public policy are long established and relatively
stable, although they may be latent rather than salient in the public
consciousness-until they are challenged. For example-domestic order, and national security. Others are newer and changing, and
partly because they are newer, they seem to be quite ambitious.
But here, too, new goals have antecedents going back a long way,
even though the precursors were, by today's standards, very modest. Western civilization, for example, has been concerned with
relieving destitution in some way since nation states emerged from
feudal Europe; but the welfare, public assistance and social insurance programs of today have advanced a long way from the
Elizabethan poor law reforms. The goals are still advancing, and
the methods of attaining them are also changing.

Policy Imperatives
Some public goals take precedence over others, although
priorities may change with time and circumstances. Goals also
vary in the firmness of public commitment. A few goals have an
overriding importance, and there is a firm commitment to a more or
less determinable objective. These goals are ••imperatives"; there
is almost a compulsion to attain them. These imperatives outrank
all others, and tend to have preferred access to funds and resources. Real difficulties arise when the policy imperatives conflict. These conflicts tax the wits, ingenuity and honesty of public
figures (and other administrators as well). It is this competition for
resources and conflict of goals which make public administration
particularly difficult in the 1980's.
Some of the country's long established and formerly latent
goals have been challenged. Newer goals keep advancing, making
more and more demands on national resources. Suddenly still
newer imperatives not only compete for resources but challenge
prior imperatives. The conflict of goals then becomes very real.
The public, and also the experts, tend to be confused. The administrator is hard put to bring his knowledge and experience to bear
upon the issues. He finds it difficult to get the real problems
understood and to get evidentiary data considered. Last but not
lll

least , it is hard for the ad ministrator to escape being made the
scapegoat if problems fall s hort of objectives, a nd if necessary
accommodations to conflicting purposes are unacce ptable to one
important segme nt of society or another.
It is no comfort to the professional administrator to know that
when political executives in positions of top power and re spons ibility blame the failure s, o r limited s uccesses, of government o n their
predecessors, a nd when they a ttack the " bureaucracy," it may be
done in order to distract attention from their own meage r performance as executive lea ders. The professional ad ministrator h as no
such recourse. H e is committed to ma king public programs wo rk to
the maximum extent possible, whether or not the goals were set
within reaso n , and in spite of the fact that mandated programs may
have been misconceived . He must try to make his advice available
in time , and with sufficient persuasiveness, to avoid these handicaps; but he is not a lways s uccessful.
/ 11f111e11ce and R esponsibility
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m e a s ure

of hi s c ha ll enge.
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rpo se of this sequence is to co ns ide r some of the policy
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system of the nation by the "great depression" of the 1930's; the
ambition to achieve endless prosperity through growth, an aspiration of the 1950's and 1960's; the transition from "creeping" to
"leaping" inflation in the 1970's; and the shocks of cumulative
pollution and approaching exhaustion of resources, which stimulated recognition of the need to restore and preserve the physical
environment. The fact that the newly urgent necessities (to limit
pollution and to economize in the use of energy), are at least in part
the direct consequence of aggressive pursuance of the earlier economic goals, makes the present dilemma the more confusing and
difficult to accept. The nation, in a sense, has committed public
officials to achieving goals, all of them "good" which nevertheless
conflict. The public has a problem-but administrators will have to
solve it, probably by meticulous and successive rational adjustments of objectives, and of the myriad economic controls and
incentives through which governments participate in the mixed
economy of the 1980's. The success of these moves, of course, will
depend upon effective communication to keep the public fully
aware of the reality of problems faced and the administrative
necessities to solve them.
Finally in this sequence come the most emotion filled imperatives of all, the goals of escaping ignorance, poverty, sickness, and
discrimination, and of providing equal opportunity for all men and
women - opportunity for self fulfillment and achievement. The
national programs which evolved at an increasing rate (but perhaps
not always with adequate preparatory analysis and planning) came
to constitute an almost bewildering array, involving national, state
and local authorities. The operations of government have become
peculiarly "federal". The goals to be attained are emotionally
supported, elastic and open ended. The knowledge of causal factors is frequently inadequate, and there is a tendency to grasp
quickly at remedies which have not been validated.
The controversy over the social and human service functions
which characterized the early 1970's was perhaps inevitable. But
unfortunately for the prospects of a reasonable outcome, the public
debate at the political level has not always been fact-based or
rational. Assertions and allegations of either success or failure
need to be supported (as frequently they have not been). So too
does either rejection or adoption of methods of action, if there is to
be clarification of policy and progress in performance. The goals
V

themsel ves seem to have been c ha lle nge d , a lbeit somewhat dis ingenuous ly. The new line of ac tio n avowedl y centers on me thods
a nd agents of action : but the thrust of ad minis tration policy in the
early a nd mid 70s seemed to be (anomalously) toward curtailment
of some programs a nd expansion of o the rs, but lea ning toward
c urtailme nt.
This s ituation highlig hts a s ignifica nt characteristic of the
s ocial imperatives. The goals a re Jess clearl y de fined, a nd possibly
less easily defina ble than security or economic imperatives. The
public commitment to them is less firm , _and resp onse to remedial
m easures is fre que ntly delayed. That is , a longer lead time is
· d ior
" reme d.1es to take effect. The res ults also are Possi"bly
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UNITl
SECURITY, OR PROTECTIVE,
FUNCTIONS
INTRODUCTION
A sense of the enduring importance of security, or protective,
functions is suggested by their prominence in the basic national law
of the United States. The preamble to the U.S. Constitution reads:
"WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America."
Those are the fundamental priorities. From efforts to achieve
them have come living, evolving institutions which are the foundation for daily governance, the foundation for the ability to live and
work together in peace. In order for those foundations to be solid,
so that the current generations may in turn meet their obligations to
America's posterity, those constitutional priorities, and their present institutional reflections deserve attention.

Government's first responsibility is to protect people and their
territory. Citizens must be and must feel secure from the threat of
force against them, whether that threat is from an external enemy, a
criminal within, or the government itself. Only when a peaceful,
orderly framework exists can individuals subsume their interests
into the general welfare, so that common energies, reinforcing
rather than conflicting, can then be applied. Hence, the preamble's
emphasis upon justice, tranquility and defense. When these three
are reasonably assured, the citizenry can together promote the
general welfare; combining the four can indeed secure the blessings of liberty.
But none of this is automatic. It must be achieved by men and
women acting within institutions, and the people and the problems
they confront are affected by contemporary conditions.
The security functions which governments in the United
States perform in order to protect people, their property, and their
interests fall primarily into two areas: national security and criminaljustice. In both areas, nongovernmental entities are also active;
for example, steel companies import ore to make tanks, and electronics firms market anti-burglary devices. But the basic responsibility for national security is borne by the federal government, and
for criminal justice by state governments. At various times in
history, neither of these security functions was an immediately
pressing concern, but even at those happy times there were significant numbers of Americans engaged in keeping the peace. Now
and for the foreseeable future, however, both security functions
are consistently at or near the very top of the public agenda, and
together they engage the efforts of about fifteen percent of employed Americans.
Actually, national security has been of high priority in the
decades from the 1940"s to the present, and contineus to be imperative. In these busy decades, the United States has fought three
foreign wars, accepted reluctantly the leadership of the Free
World, multiplied enormously the extent of its diplomatic and
political activity abroad, and developed an unprecedented degree
of economic interdependence with other countries. After the devisi ve war in Vietnam and the convulsions of Watergate, the nation
tried for a period to turn somewhat away from external concerns.
However, the events in Iran, Afghanistan, the Middle East and in
the SA lT II ncgot iat ions, reawakened public consciousness of
how important were such corn.:crns. In the 1980's, the American
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people will be much involved with important problems and issues
in the national security field.
The criminal justice area on the other hand, had attracted
only relatively ~uperficial and 'sporadic attention fro~ the Ame~can people untll the rates of violent crime soared m the 1960 s.
People then became alarmed about crime in the streets. They
avoided the central cities, especially at night, and put extr~ locks
on their doors. Political leaders resonated to the ever shriller,
louder cries for '"law and order" and ifracist code words may have
sometimes been involved, it was al~o ciear that the loudest cries
were coming from Blacks, who were the main victims and wanted
better protection. The potential damage which fear and violence
might do to social cohesion and prospects for democratic government became clear to many people. Major efforts, therefore, were
made by all levels of government in the late t960's and the 1970's to
improve the situation. Throughout this period, public opinion survey after survey consistently showed the crime problem to be the
foremost concern of the general public. Only as economic problems worsened in late 1978 did crime slip from first place on the list.
Even so, it remains a crucial rpoblem and promises to continue as
such for years to come.
Achieving even relative security in both areas abounds with
difficult problems. Some of these difficulties are much in the public
eye and are often discussed with passion. Other problems are
visible only to the experienced, perceptive specialist, even though
some of these may be even more important to the nation ·s future
tranquility and security than problems which get headlines. Impatient people, and some political leaders, grasp for quick and easy
answers, become frustrated easily, and tend to look for devils to
blame. There is a constant temptation toward single-factor
analysis, explaining everything in terms of just one element in a
situation which in fact is intricately complex. Public administrators
who themselves are not fully immune to such tendencies, need to
keep them particularly in mind.
For, given the importance of these problems and the amount of
attention which governments give them, it is rather unlikely that
any of them are simple to explain or easy to resolve. Before they
can be really understood, considerable data must be gathered and
grasped, with much use of concepts of cause and effect. Before
policies or actions of any value can be selected, extensive analysis
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. to pro t e ct people and their
Government's first respons1·b·1·
1 1ty 1s
t 0f
territory. Citizens must be and must feel secure from the threa
force against them, whether that threat is from an external enemy, a
criminal within, or the government itself. Only when a peaceful,
orderly framework exists can individuals subsume their intere~ts
into the general welfare, so that common energies, reinforci~g
rather than conflicting, can then be applied. Hence, the preambles
emphasis upon justice, tranquility and defense. When these three
are reasonably assured, the citizenry can together promote the
general welfare; combining the four can indeed secure the blessings of liberty.
But none of this is automatic. It must be achieved by men and
women acting within institutions, and the people and the problems
they confront are affected by contemporary conditions.
The security functions which governments in the United
States perform in order to protect people, their property, and their
interests fall primarily into two areas: national security and criminaljustice. In both areas, nongovernmental entities are also active;
for example, steel companies import ore to make tanks, and electronics firms market anti-burglary devices. But the basic responsibility for national security is borne by the federal government, and
for criminal justice by state governments. At various times in
history, neither of these security functions was an immediately
pressing concern, but even at those happy times there were significant numbers of Americans engaged in keeping the peace. Now
and for the foreseeable future, however, both security functions
are consistently at or near the very top of the public agenda, and
together they engage the efforts of about fifteen percent of employed Americans.
Actually, national security has been of high priority in the
decades from the 1940's to the present, and contineus to be imperative. In these busy decades, the United States has fought three
foreign wars, accepted reluctantly the leadership of the Free
World, multiplied enormously the extent of its diplomatic and
political activity abroad, and developed an unprecedented degree
of economic interdependence with other countries. After the de visive war in Vietnam and the convulsions of Watergate, the nation
tried for a period to turn somewhat away from external concerns.
However, the events in Iran, Afghanistan, the Middle East and in
the SALT II negotiations, reawakened public consciousness of
how important were such concerns. In the 1980's, the American
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people will be much involved with important problems and issues
in the national security field.
The criminal justice area, on the other hand, had attracted
only relatively superficial and sporadic attention from the American people until the rates of violent crime soared in the 1960's.
People then became alarmed about crime in the streets. They
avoided the central cities, especially at night, and put extra locks
on their doors. Political leaders resonated to the ever shriller,
louder cries for .. law and order" and, ifracist code words may have
sometimes been involved, it was also clear that the loudest cries
were coming from Blacks, who were the main victims and wanted
better protection. The potential damage which fear and violence
might do to social cohesion and prospects for democratic government became clear to many people. Major efforts, therefore, were
made by all levels of government in the late 1960's and the 1970's to
improve the situation. Throughout this period, public opinion survey after survey consistently showed the crime problem to be the
foremost concern of the general public. Only as economic problems worsened in late 1978 did crime slip from first place on the list.
Even so, it remains a crucial rpoblem and promises to continue as
such for years to come.
Achieving even relative security in both areas abounds with
difficult problems. Some of these difficulties are much in the public
eye and are often discussed with passion. Other problems are
visible only to the experienced, perceptive specialist, even though
some of these may be even more important to the nation ·s future
tranquility and security than problems which get headlines. Impatient people, and some political leaders, grasp for quick and easy
answers, become frustrated easily, and tend to look for devils to
blame. There is a constant temptation toward single-factor
analysis, explaining everything in terms of just one element in a
situation which in fact is intricately complex. Public administrators
who themselves are not fully immune to such tendencies, need to
keep them particularly in mind.
For, given the importance of these problems and the amount of
attention which governments give them, it is rather unlikely that
any of them are simple to explain or easy to resolve. Before they
can be really understood, considerable data must be gathered and
grasped, with much use of concepts of cause and effect. Before
policies or actions of any value can be selected, extensive analysis
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is essential, involving consideration of alternatives and the conse-11.1.1.•.•.1:
quences, including side effects which are likely to follow.
'!j\
,
Yet these are not impenetrable
mysteries to be compre hen de d ,'Ji)';
only by specialists, if at all. The generalist who approaches p~ob-'.!!/
lems and issues in either national security or criminal justice m a1 (,
professional manner can penetrate these matters to some degree, if.;_::
he or she wishes, and takes time to do so.
'
As in all areas of public administration, professional analysis
is essential with regard to the security, or protective, functions.
Problems and issues in these areas must be considered analytically '
.in order to deal with reality and to determine the wise course of . ·
action. The points discussed before are elementary in professional '
analysis and should be kept in mind.
111

Keys to Professional Analysis

To master the professional approach of a public administration
generalist is of course an objective of the three-year Nova DPA
program; at this early state in it, one ought no to expect high
competence. But now is not too soon to begin looking analytically
at problems and issues. The following points are basic to doing so
in a professional fashion:
CAUSE AND EFFECT: Public administration involves people
and organized groups of people. Although ~he way they behave is
not random nor often capricious, neither 1s there perfect und _
· be.hav1or.
· Tco pre d"1ct requires emer,
standing of how to predict the1r
ploying concepts of what cause will produce what effect. Sometimes uncertainty suggests using several a!te~native cause-andeffect concepts in parallel analyses. Analysis 1s poor which uses
such concepts unconsciously, leaving most of them unstated, unrecognized, and implicit; for it is prone to error. Professional
analysis which identifies explicitly the causal concepts being used,
so far as possible is less likely to err.
THE FACTS: To collect and comprehend enough of the relevant facts is a prior necessity for sound analysis. Since facts often
come packaged in viewpoint, especially when important policy
issues are at stake, discriminating judgment must be applied to
them. If several different viewpoints can be consulted, mutual
correction may result, although occasionaJiy, adversaries may
share a common misunderstanding. Unless time-urgency truly
demands it, the professional generalist never substitutes his own
general awareness for the more current, more specific knowledge
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obtainable from expert sources. Neither does he take expert contributions at face value, however; but instead, he applies the critical tests of experience and common sense.
CLINICAL OBJECTIVITY: One's own viewpoint, policy preferences, and even emotions can act as filters, which distort how
one perceives facts and which thus obstruct clear understanding.
To perceive objectively requires recognizing one's own particular
biases. It is professional to deal with data objectively and clinically.
DIVIDING FOR MANAGEABILITY: Even very complex issues
can be analytically penetrated and divided into parts which are of
manageable size. To break apart an issue is to permit concentrated
attention to the adequacy of data and casual concepts, the existence of implicit assumptions, and the presence of routes toward
resolution, with respect to each component part. The alternative to
thus decomposing a complex question is to treat it impressionistically and intuitively, which lowers the likelihood of success. The
professional way is to analyze.
DYNAMIC ANALYSIS: Most analysis in public administration
is dynamic analysis. Hardly anything an administrator is really
interested in rests in stable equilibrium, and the administrator
usually seeks ways to change it for the better. Dynamic analysis
focuses on interactions and usually involves alternatives. frequently for choosing among various options for action or policy. By
using data and concepts of cause and effect, the professional tries
to visualize what would be the consequences and the implications
of each option, for this permits comparison and a sounder basis for.
choice.
PROBLEMS AND ISSUES: The importance of objective
analysis should be kept in mind as the two topic areas of Unit 2.1
are considered. The intent here is to take note of some of the main
••problems" and .. issues". The discussion below will assume a
basic difference between these two concepts. A problem is taken to
be a rather enduring obstacle which lies between the individual and
the attainment of his broad objectives. Ways around it may be
found, or ways to ameliorate its ill effects may be discovered. but
the problem cannot be finally .. solved". that is, it will not disappear. The existence of such a problem is widely accepted. although
different people might describe it in somewhat different terms. An
issue, by contrast, is a matter which needs decision: What public
action, if any, should be taken? Agreement may be narrower about
how to define the issue, or even about whether such an issue really
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·d d or
exists . In any case , an issue is relatively transie nt ; o n_ce deci e 1-~ a
set aside , it will be succeeded by other is sues, hke steps
journey.
.
he
Public debate is ordinaril y about issues , but occurs against t
backdrop of problems . Contending parties often describe that
backdrop differently, for either perceptual or tac tical reasons.
Among thoughtful professio nals, however, the priority goes to
correct identification of the problems, so that those issues can then
be chosen which , when resolved, will make the most worthwhile
contribution. As Ma ry Parker Follett explained so ma ny years ago ,
early and acc ura te identification of the proble m is a most important
step in avoiding frustrating conflict over iss ues , and in reaching
agreement among inte rested pa rties as to the wise course of action.
This the me runs through her essays on Dynamic Administration,
which you will read in Seque nce 4.1, "Organizatio n and Ma nageme nt Principles" . They will repay careful study.

NATIONAL SECURITY
What Is It ?
The term " national security" is no t prec·I s
. .
in differe nt senses. It is used here simply b
e, a nd 1s interpreted
·1
. . .
ecause no bett
m.
ava1 able . What 1t signifies is the s upre mely funda
e r ter . 15
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erntory
d
. ··
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.
.
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d th .
operations a re involved , but the function a d h
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eir
mo re tha n that. Diplo matic and inte rna tiona; ~- ~ te rm ~~ver far
1
vital parts in na tio na l securit y, a nd interna tio pol ttica\ ac~1V1ty ? ~Y
I
na economic actlVtty
11, 1nc rc Hs 111gly 1n uc nt1 a . In preve nting war the
.
. to
.
..
...
.
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For present purposes, then, ··national security" comprehends
the work of the State and Defense departments, the military services, the Agency for International Development, the CIA, and
much of what the rreasury Department does. Scores of other
agencies also contribute, such as the Federal Aviation Administration, the FBI, and NASA.
The White House manages the national security function,
making substantial use of the National Security staff, headed by
the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, as
well as of the executive departments and agencies. A dozen or so
congressional committees are continuously involved, plus others
intermittently. Coordination of all this is a highly developed, but
occasionally imperfect, art.
In addition to these central agencies and figures, throughout
not just the federal government but the society at large, are many,
many others with some involvement in national security. Manufacturing industries, communications companies, agricultural experimenters, think tanks, the U.S. Olympic Committee, and wheat
farmers are among them. The degree of government influence on
what they do may range from slight to zero. Nevertheless, the
persons responsible for national security must at least be aware of
how these nongovernmental entities may be affecting the national
security situation, and sometimes may need to encourage, subsidize, educate, or divert one or another-within the rather narrow
limits of applicable law.
Here is one of the great differences between this nation and
many others. What is done abroad by organizations and most
individuals from the Soviet Union, East Germany, China, or Vietnam-whether trade missions, scientists, or athletes-is done for
national purposes, and is supervised and controlled (sometimes
imperfectly) by the government which sends them. But the U.S.
government puts very few restrictions, perhaps mostly taxationrelated, upon what missionaries, computer companies, or the Harlem Globetrotters do outside the U.S. It most certainly does not
use them for state purposes, even though they may generate goodwill, foreign exchange, or other benefits. Between these two extremes lie many gradations in the focused use for national purposes
of activity abroad. Even some of America's close allies exercise
some control over such activity by their citizens, and more control
is attempted by many Third World countries. What is pertinent
here is that, while national security is affected both negatively and

7

positively by nongovernmental activity abroad, American notions
~ffreedom cause the U.S. to abstain from marshaling and controlhng the activities of American citizens toward national goals.

Some Pertinent Concepts
What national security includes can be seen in another
perspective by noting a few of the main concepts within the field.
Most of these terms are used loosely and imprecisely in genera}
discussion and in the press, while specialists usually define them
far more rigorously than do the brief characterizations which follow.
Consider, for instance the two terms national interests and
vital interests. Both denote' whatever a nation judges it must protect from foreign-originated harm, in order to ensure the nation's
well-being. There is a grave distinction, however, which average
newspaper readers (and sometimes writers) may overlook. For a
vital interest is perceived as all but indispensable to survival, and
hence something the nation would fight to preserve. It is worthwhile for the reader to reflect for a moment about what items he or
she would list among U.S. vital interests. (No two lists are likely to
be identical, nor would the lists of a group of national security
specialists.)
The concept of deterrence has spawned a massive literature in
~he past 20 or 30 years, but the basic approach is an ancient one. It
1s to dissuade hostile action by causing a potential aggressor to see
the likelihood that effective counteraction would bring greater
costs than gains. Now that catastrophically destructive nuclear
weapons are so abundant, and the modes of using them are so
varied, scores of variant expressions - graduated deterrence, finite deterrence, conventional deterrence, mutual assured destruction, credible deterrence, stable deterrence, and so on - have
come to be used. Each such expression is usually shorthand for a
long and tightly reasoned set of abstractions, but all have to do with
discouraging attack.
. A term often heard during the 1970s was balance of power.
~mce school days most Americans have understood this as an
1?ternational system in which one power shifts its policy or alliances so as to reinforce first one group of nations and then a
somewhat different group, simply to keep any one power-grouping
from gaining dominance or undertaking aggression. Yet some
people interpret the term to mean a dead-even, neck-and-neck
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situation of U.S. and Soviet power; since many of these Americans
want the U.S. stronger than the USSR, the concept is repugnant to
them. Besides these two interpretations, another five or six are
also occasionally found.
Imperialism is a long-standing concept recently used with
several new twists in politically purposeful ways. It has meant the
control by one state over other peoples, often distant, who thus
experience alien rule and probably economic exploitation. For
most Americans, it is difficult to conceive how the relationship
between the USSR and, say, East Germany is not precisely that.
Yet it is Americans, who invented decolonization and-to be blunt
-imposed it on European allies, who are called imperialists by the
Soviets. No doubt they have in mind American economic activity
in, for example, Latin America. Some antiwar protesters in the
1960s called the U.S. government imperialist, too, saying that it
prevented the Vietnamese people from choosing who should govern them. The term was neutral or even positive early in the
century, but now it is clearly pejorative.
A principle especially urged by the U.S. isfree trade, or the
absence of governmental interference with normal free-market
commerce across international boundaries. Even though the U.S.
is dependent upon imports in some critical areas, international
trade is far less important to it than to nations such as Japan and
Britain - or even Venezuela. Domestic pressures are no less felt
here than elsewhere: just as Japanese auto manufacturers want no
foreign penetration of their markets, so also do American shoe
manufacturers and unions want insulation from low-cost competition from abroad. When such pressures are too strong for a central
government to withstand, various measures of protectionism are
applied. These may be import quotas, high tariffs, export subsidies, minimum price controls, or some other subtle barriers, but
their purpose is to protect the markets of domestic producers.
How Is It Changing?
Until the late 1960s, national security matters were considered
to have two main components. One was diplomatic or political,
while the other was the defense or military component. Major
changes, however, have made the inclusion of an economic and a
domestic component quite frequent as well.
International economic questions, it is true, had on previous
occasions entered the national security area. In the early 1960s, for
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national security matters. This applied whether the executive preferred a more active or a more passive policy, whether more foreign
aid was proposed or less. The reason was not better public understanding of the national security field, for actually the public's
attention to it had declined. But the public, often influenced by
small activist groups, no longer assumed contentedly that the
proper authorities would act wisely in the public behalf. Instead
one often saw an assertive insistence that responsible authority
was likely to be either wrong or wrongheaded. While proliferating
interest groups urged their single views, and the media stressed the
negatives about government, the Congress was quick to resonate
and then to legislate some new encroachment upon the Executive's
discretion. However much this seemed the normal working of
pluralist democracy, many professionals believed it had been so
exaggerated in the national security area during the 1970s that it
often seriously harmed the public's true interests.
The turnaround of national policy on Vietnam persuaded
many people that orchestrated protests and media manipulation
could gain success for views initiaIIy held by only a few. In a tumult
of revelations about conduct in Southeast Asia and the Watergate
scandals, the .. Imperial Pesidency" was denounced, the term .. national security" took on a bad odor, the CIA's secrets and sources
were exposed, and much legislation sought to eliminate all opportunity for federal sin. As turnover in Congress increased, new
members hastened to respond to the reformist temper of the times.
Congress repeatedly intervened and upset delicate international
settlements such as those for the Greek-Turkish conflict in Cyprus,
U .S.-Soviet trade, and, very nearly, the Panama Canal Treaties.
As Congress's power grew and economic issues became more
important, domestic pressures for economic protectionism intensified. Scores of constituencies sought federal action to ward off
foreign economic competition, whether from Japanese steel,
Czechoslovak shoes, or whatever. The Executive, certain that free
trade greatly advances the national interest, and intent upon
eliminating hurtful protectionism by the Japanese and others,
found these domestic pressures incessant, erosive, and all but
impossible to withstand.
Since legislation and appropriations by the Congress establish
the framework within which national security can be pursued. and
since interest groups ride ever closer herd on the Congress and its
multiplied staffs, the executive branch found that most national
security issues involved a significant domestic component.
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gence system, possibly the world's best, to near impotence. As the
U.S. stumbled into a largely self-inflicted inflation, the price of oil
was abruptly quadrupled, causing economic convulsions and apparently enduring harm to the world's perception of U.S. economic
leadership. Many other factors were also involved, but the dollar
so declined that its status as the world's reserve currency came into
doubt. Then, having abolished nonvoluntary military service, the
U.S. cut its armed forces to a size supportable by volunteers and
dropped the defense budget to the lowest percentage of GNP since
the post-World War II demobilization. Meanwhile the Congress
asserted itself in foreign policy so often and so forcefully as to
create doubt abroad about the ability of any president to conduct a
coherent national security policy. Many observers said that the
nation's foreign affairs establishment had suffered a .. failure of
nerve." In recognizing at last that the U.S. was not omnipotent in
world affairs, Americans generally seemed to have fallen nearly to
the despairing view that America could do nothing, that nothing
was really worth trying.
But in mid-1979, a great debate began to shape up, and promised to refocus public attention upon national security. The SACT II
agreements and the constitutional requirement for Senate action
on them provided the occasion, but the debate seemed sure to
continue long after that action was complete. A year earlier the
Panama Canal Treaties had raised the activity levels, and then the
so-called •• Arc of Crisis" (Angola, Zaire, Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Yemen, and, resoundingly, Iran) had erupted, bringing
new energy problems as well as discontents about American ineffectiveness abroad. Some opponents of SALT II had long been
organized and active, while the news media had been increasing
the coverage of the U .S.-Soviet relationship. There was even the
beginning of some open discussion of how best to man the armed
services.
Levels of consciousness about national security, already rising, seemed bound to be further stimulated by the SALT debates.
Public attitudes, apparently more concerned and more supportive
of defense increases than the Congress generally, seemed likely to
become more manifest and presumably would be reflected in
Washington. But to reach national consensus on new nuclear
weapons strategies, on how to man the services, and on a host of
other national security questions would surely require more than
just a year or two. The prospect therefore seemed to be for some
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years of higher intensity attention to national security and significantly increased appropriations for defense.
Considering the national economy's visible prospects, government spending for nonsecurity purposes could thus be expected
to decline proportionately. Hence the impact of national security
upon public administrators seemed apt to increase.

NATIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS
Against that background, several of the most basic of the
enduring problems in this field will be considered. In the next
section, some of the current issues before the nation in the early
1980s will be noted, but it is first necessary to identify the problem
areas from which they arise.
THE Nothing else remotely compares to the human and so..
NUCLEARcial destruction which could come through unrestrained
HAZARD nuclear war. The U.S. and the Soviet Union both pos..
sess many thousands of nuclear weapons aimed today at each
other, and if used they could cause scores-perhaps hundreds-of
millions of casualties. Several other nations have small nuclear
arsenals as well. While some analysts suggest that very limited
nuclear conflict is feasible, many strategists and political leaders
?elieve the profound uncertainties of escalation m_ak~ this m?st
imprudent to consider. The dangers and the uncertamti~s do bnng
some security, as Bernard Brodie explained in his class1~ War and
Politics, and there are some positive factors: fewer ~at1ons ~ave
mad e nuclear weapons than was feare d , s ta tes men are mcreasmgly
.
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no reduction in the physical capacity for mutual devastation.
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a Ince misunderstanding and irrationality are not totally unknown

rn~ng the world's statesmen even Brodie judged that unrestraine d nuclear war was still a' live risk.
Americans seldom remember that risk. however. They
h aveMost
·
· es
eve e vi'd ently learned to live with it. Only during
great ens
rn ry decade or so have they momentarily realized how enorousiy greater is this nuclear hazard than the total of all the other

14

--

}

.

risks that normally engage their attention. Whatever the public's
mental block, however, the U.S. government must keep the nuclear threat constantly in mind. For government's most fundamental duty is to make the chances for general nuclear war ever more
remote.
A Intensifying the nuclear hazard is the fact that tenTURBULENTsions among nations are frequent, but no orderly
WORLD system exists to resolve them. There have been historical periods when international conflict was routinely resolved
without significant armed violence. Following each World War
there was brief hope that another such period might emerge. In
fact, the prime objective of U.S. policy for over a generation now
has been what President Kennedy called "a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own
future and their own system so long as it does not threaten the
freedom of others." Gratifying progress is visible in the former
West European cockpit. Elsewhere, new nationalisms, political
violence, and accelerated ferment have contributed to making
armed conflict more frequent than ever. Despite sustained U.S.
efforts, the world still lacks an assured mechanism for resolving
problems among nations without violence. Several times a year the
U.S. must weigh the obvious advantages of noninvolvement in a
conflict elsewhere against the potential long-run effects on the
chances for a larger and possibly a nuclear war. The security of
Americans is what causes the U.S. government to pay attention to
conflicts between Arabs and Israel, India and Pakistan, Vietnam
and Cambodia, Angola and Zaire.
THE Led initially by the U.S., all industrialized naDEVELOPMENT tions have come to recognize that their own
GAP national interests require them to help the
less-developed countries advance economically. There has been
encouraging progress in development, plus vivid success for such
countries as Brazil, South Korea, Mexico, and Taiwan. But some
of the poorer countries see the gap between the industrialized
nations and themselves as widening rather than closing. They have
begun banding together to some extent to increase their pressure
on the West, for the changes in how they think have outpaced the
changes in how they live. The result is, as Zbigniew Brzebinski
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h~ve a vested interest in activism. They and the Members especially have been subjected increasingly to rather intense pressures
from single-issue interest groups, as well.
Nevertheless, in the national security area, the Congress has
gone too far. Unless some of the President's authority and freedom
of action are restored, the U.S. performance in the national security area will suffer.

NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES
The above problems are intensely durable, although they may
change in intensity. One way to ease them is through careful choice
of the issues on which to act. The issues listed below are likely to be
prominent during the early 1980s.
U.S. RELATIONSHIPS Besides the U.S., there is only one
WITH GREAT POWERS other superpower, the Soviet Union.
How the U.S. should relate to it is the central element in our
national security policy. In the 1970s, the themes of detente and
arms limitation were prominent. Considerable Soviet involvement
in such conflicts as Angola, Somalia-Ethiopia, and VietnamCambodia went essentially unanswered. But as SAIT II came
before the public eye, there was much apprehensiveness over the
sustained high pace of Soviet arms programs, which seemed well in
excess of defensive needs, and over the new projecting of Soviet
military power abroad. U .S.-Soviet trade remained at lower levels
than had once been expected, but it did include the export of some
advanced U.S. technology. There were some American voices
calling for a sterner U.S. stance toward the USSR, but also many
which insisted that sustained, even increased communication with
the Soviets promised better prospects for lasting peace.
With her 960 million people, China may one day become a
superpower. Her economy is scarcely modem, and whether
further volatility of her leadership and policies will occur is still
uncertain. But the USSR is acutely sensitive to China's ponderous,
if ill-equipped, military forces - which do include some nuclear
weapons - and is clearly apprehensive about any cooperation
between the U.S. and China. In restoring its long-severed relationships with China, the U.S. has been attentive not only to the
Sino-Soviet situation but also to China's natural gravitational attraction toward nearby oil-hungry Japan.
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If the armed forces are to be strengthened, defense budgets
must rise, perhaps substantially. Old disputes about governmental
priorities would thus be revived, and new ones probably appear.
Even so, the question of nonvoluntary military service may well
prove to be the most hotly argued aspect of the issue. 1\vo alterna-

tive means are visible which could substitute for volunteer recruiting. One would be a much-modified form of selective service which
would eliminate the unfair deferments of the previous one. The
other, which has attracted more attention, involves ··national service," in which all young men and women would be offered choice
arnong a variety of ways to serve the nation. Besides active military duty and longer reserve service, there are proposals to include
conservation work, hospital and school service, community development programs, services to local governments, and the like.
The rewards and terms of these would be structured with the intent
of meeting defense needs effectively.
WHAT INTERNATIONAL This issue concerns what rules
ECONOMIC STRUCTURES? and institutional arrangements

should apply to the transfers among nations of goods and services.
Since World War II scores of regional and worldwide initiatives
pave addressed the problems of economic cooperation, trade preference, foreign exchange management, and the like. Of these·,
some have made lasting contributions, and others less. During the
t950s and especially the 1960s, while the world's nations were
rapidly becoming more interdependent economically, they also
~ere experiencing more disequilibrium among the formerly stable
mechanisms for international trade. Meanwhile the number of
politically independent states was multiplying about fourfold. Although approximately two-thirds of these new nations possessed
1ess economic power than some U.S., Dutch, and Swiss multinational corporations, many of them were trying to adjust selectively
the rules of the game for international trade so as to favor themselves-often at serious cost to other countries. The oil embargo
a,nd price rise of 1973-74 occurred, followed by inflations, recessions, turmoil in managing foreign exchange, new non-tariff trade
barriers, currency devaluations, and interruptions to economic
growth in less-developed as well as industrialized countries. A
flurry of international economic expedients has not yet produced
the relatively stable predictability generally wanted, while the
t.1ncertain dollar and Iran's convulsions have further complicated
fllatters.
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·At this stage, then , the nations of the world feel a n urgent need
for updated and extended structures for inte rnational economic
activity. Since the U.S . is the strongest single economic unit, its
proposals and its example will carry much weight. Its former
economic dominance, however, has faded significantl y, while its
own domestic economic diffic ulties have worsened. The central
problem is that U .S. proposals, to be effective, must satisfy both an
international and a domestic a udience. Pervadi ng the ma ny questions the U.S. must face in dealing with this issue, writes Marina
V. N. Whitman in an early 1979 Foreign Affairs, is o ne common
theme: "the trade-off between policies that would promote the
ac hievement of specific national economic or political goals, on the
one hand, and those likely to promote the viability of a coherent
international economic system in the long run on the other."
WHAT ABOUT THE T he ways by whic h the U.S . has
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES? tried to help stimulate economic

de velopment in less-developed countries (LDCs) are many. While
the public tends to notice only direct U.S . aid by grants of money,
relatively little of this is done. More assistance is given through
multi-lateral institutions (e.g. , the World Bank) a nd by long-term,
f~vorable interest rate loans. Nongovernmental developme nt assistance is encouraged, for example , by inducing a corpora tion to
establish a man ufacturing ente rp rise and to train local labor and
managers. Ed ucatio nal development and transfer of suita ble
technology are emphasized. Lately the U .S. has focused its efforts
toward the poorest countries and the poore r people in them. But
overall the U.S. level of effort has fallen behind pas t performance
and behind what other industrialized countries a re doing. The
Congress also has slowed and complicated the administering of aid
by legislating over a hundred provisos which projects must meet.
For development assistance to LDCs, there is not much of a
constituency domesticall y, especially where low labor costs lead to
underselling U.S. domestic producers .
By s uccessfully urging decolonization a nd by pioneering in aid
t? the LDCs, the U.S . had done muc h to raise the levels of expectation in the LDCs. Muc h good will toward America pe rsists there
(more than many America ns realize) and during a generation of
effort , the U.S. has learned muc h about what does not work and
some about what does. Will the U.S. now, just whe n aware ness of
the development gap is becoming an unsettling factor, continue to
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taper off, or will it decide that long-run U.S. interests require doing
more? Recent evidence suggests that public and political interest in
such a question may have bottomed out and begun to rise.

RECONSTRUCTING OUR A series of press exposes, CongresFOREIGN INTELLIGENCE sional inquiries, and security vioCAPABILITY lations during the early and middle
1970s brought the U.S. Intelligence community, especially the
CIA, into public disrepute. It was clear that in at least a few
instances some CIA employees had used methods and undertaken
tasks of which the American people did not approve. As the press
and the Congress avidly pursued allegations of such behavior, great
quantities of material that had been highly secret were openly
published. The people revealing it were not punished, and a few
were acclaimed by some Americans as heroes. The effectiveness
of the U.S. foreign intelligence community suffered severely, not
least because many valuable sources stopped being sources. lest
they too suffer damage and danger by being explicitly named in the
American press. Other handicaps to U.S. intelligence accumulated
rapidly: restrictions imposed by the White House and Congress.
requirements to clear secret operations with eight different congressional committees, plummeting morale, and then the loss of
territorial access to a number of key intelligence collection sites. In
1978 and 1979, controversy about the CIA Director and his removal
of intelligence professionals was frequent. In the SAIT II debate.
confidence that the U.S. intelligence apparatus could verify its
provisions was far from universal.
The imperatives of an open and democratic society are not
readily reconciled with secret intelligence activity. The idea that
the national budget, an open and public document, somehow deceptively conceals substantial sums of money for intelligence
makes some people uneasy, for example. In the present climate of
general distrust for authority. some Americans are apprehensive
about any secret operations within government. Given the traditional attitudes toward personal freedom. one particular fear is
that the CIA might come to exercise some police powers. perhaps
selectively. There is even some residue of the notion Henry Stimson expressed when. as Secretary of State in the 1920s. he
abolished a fruitful code-breaking operation. saying ... Gentlemen
do not read each other's mail.··
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At issue in 1979 and 1980 was the charter for U.S. intelligence
- the various authorities and restrictions which would apply. As
deliberations progressed, some congressional anxiety about the
harm already done to U.S. intelligence results was visible. In that
same light, the question of criminal penalties for revealing official
secrets was being considered. Some intelligence experts believed
that in the best of circumstances it would take five to ten years to
rebuild a fully effective foreign intelligence capability. During that
period a number of other events and policy questions are bound to
appear which will permit contributions, for better or worse, by
press and public, by president and Congress.
DEMONSTRATING When Soviet nuclear strength
NATIONAL WILL mounted in the 1950s so that deterAND DETERMINATION rence was no longer one-way but, instead, mutual, the concept of credibility became prominent in
national security discussions. The notion was that mere possession
of strength was not by itself enough to influence an opponent, for
one's willingness to use that strength had to be believable to the
opponent. Thus, in 1961, after Khrushchev had bullied President
Kennedy about Soviet insistence on controlling all of Berlin, the
president called some reserve troops to active duty and sent significant army reinforcements to Europe-to validate the U.S. threat
to fight if necessary to keep West Berlin free. His action was visibly
supported by the Congress and the public; the Soviets could
scarcely disbelieve U.S. determination, and deterrence thus succeeded without gunfire. The showing of U.S. will had effect not
only on the Soviets, however, but also crucially on America's
allies, whose stanchness, thus reinforced, further lessened the risk
of either armed conflict or damage to the common interest.
The pertinence of this is that a subterranean question existsthat of how the allies and the potential opponents of America may ,
interpret its national will. Differences of judgment about that will
create controversy about national security policies. Three or possibly four major points seem to apply. First, the Soviet arsenal,
having steadily grown at a rate faster than America's, is now
judged somewhere in the range of equivalence or slight superiority,
depending on who counts what. Second, the Vietnam outcome in
the 1970s made a vivid impression abroad whose full meaning
Americans may not altogether grasp. At least some European
leaders interpret the U.S. withdrawal as a clear sign that the U.S.
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lacked national determination, and they are uneasy about what
degree of determination underlies U.S. commitment to the common defense in NATO. How the Soviet leaders interpret it is a
mystery, but a rather important one. Third, to a number of admittedly low-order military actions during the years since, the U.S.
has made essentially no response despite some clear harm to U.S.
national interests and some Soviet and occasionally Cuban involvement. These of course are the events in Angola, Zaire,
Ethiopia, Somalia, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Iran. Both America's
opponents and its allies, not only those in Europe, know well that
the U.S. possessed some capability to influence those events but
abstained from using it. Voices are sometimes heard abroad attributing this, also, to a lack of U.S. will, and one wonders about
the voices which are silent. The fourth point, a tentative one, is that
leaders abroad might perceive Americans as doing little to reduce
oil consumption or otherwise deal effectively with an already economically damaging energy problem, and might interpret this too
as confirming their forebodings about national will in the United
States.
Many Americans, of course, will judge such thoughts unreal
or not relevant. The U.S. should never be the world's policeman,
they hold, and it withdrew from Vietnam simply to correct a grave
national error. What the U.S. can do is limited, after all, and is best
done mostly at home, in trying to perfect a society and economy
where equal justice, and equal opportunity for self-fulfillment are
accessible to all. Nor should this be read, they would continue, as
introducing any doubt at all about U.S. willingness, even determination, to defend its own freedom and the freedom of its allies. Of
course the U.S. will defend them; the question is simply of the best
manner of doing so.
Indeed. Precisely in this area of choosing the best national
security policies will other Americans urge that the matter of
national determination is a major criterion. The forces the nation
maintains and what it does with them, they will insist, should be
consciously chosen so as to resolve doubts abroad about U.S.
determination, the better to deter conflict. If debate on this issue
should occur only during short-run crisis, then the risk of dangerous error would rise.
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such spe .
C1aJ·
corporat·
•zed elements as tax law admiralty Jaw, probate law,
•on
..
'
levels of fe I aw, an d m1htary
law. There
were severaJ types and
lower le deral courts and a great variety of courts at state and
thousandVeJs. Under the broad umbreJJa of administrative law,
seemed ts of quasi-judicial tribunals existed whose functions
In a(~ blend imperceptibly from regulation to enforcement.
governed these elements, America has sought to have its affairs
The_ideaJ ~ laws rather. than by the unguided discretion '!f men.
atta1nabi/ ~l of equal fairness for every citizen was not ulttmat~ly
outcorn ' smce laws were not self-executing and few reaJ-bfe
were to ~:;ver satisfied all parties equally. Yet, if all Americans
essential e shared confidence in how they were governed, it was
Bee to pursue that goal unceasingly.
tice systause the pursuit went on amid incessant change, the jus·
stances erns h a d to adapt continuously to contemporary c1rcum80
to resp~
th the laws and the mechanisms for applying them had
and eve::id to technology, social development, population s~ifts,
deeply ro~· At_ the same time, however, these syst~ms remamed
Carta and tted 10 old English principles, deriving _via the Mag?a
ness and he common law, which create expectations about fairstate. i\ a_bout how the citizen relates to a far from omnipotent
and elabncient standards of justice have been greatly reenforced
Constitu~·rated by the bill of rights and the 14th Amendment to the
Roland 1/ 0 n of the United States as interpreted by the Courts.
this Proc gger has called the contlibutions of the Warren Court to
can hist ess one of the five authentic social revolutions in AmeriMosher Ory. (You will read his essay in the volume edited by
' A.,n .
.
ture assi
e~ican Publ,c Administration: Past,. Present and Fugned m Sequence 9.)
What
. II y important
.
. .
. he
legislat. wa s especia
for public adm1mstrators
mt
upon •ve and judicial elaboration of private rights was the effect
how Agove_rnment, and it was great. The justice system affected
upon . rn~r~cans were governed and by whom. It had crucial impact
whet~:d•~•d~al faith in government. People judged for themselves
we~ hr Justice applied impartially to each. whether all people
numeb eld equally accountable for conforming to the law. If large
the ers Were to lack confidence that, allowing for human error.
8
ti /stem treated them fairly, would government be able to funcon.
btttention is here focused upon criminal justice not because
pro ems were lacking elsewhere in American justice. In fact.
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there were many. Americans were a very litigious people_. Som:
said that there were far too many laws and lawyers. Certainly th,:',,
'50s, '60s and '70s witnessed a surge of legal action on behalf o~:
many who had previously not found access to it. Who would doubt,;
that on balance this surge had yielded more good than bad, if oolY1;
because of the social and economic injustices it had so far set rigb~?1i
- .I
But the civil dockets in most courts were extremely long, and othe_M
problems abounded as well.
, I

Nevertheless, the fear of violent crime was the leading coi\f i
cern of the American people from the mid-1960's to the late 1970'~; i
and even in 1980 only such vital matters as inflation and uneire ·
ployment were above it on poll af~er poll. _Because the AmericaQ:;
people were so alarmed_ ab~~t crime, their .~olitic~l leaders hadi1
responded, and terms hke law_ ~nd o_rder and 'crime in the.1,
streets" appeared regularly in poht1c_al discourse. There Was Iegi~f
lation at state and federal lev~ls, with by far the most importanfil,
being the federal government s Safe Streets Act of 1968
~i~
, seve~ ,
d
d
d
h
I
h
times thereafter amende . t a create t e Law EnforcemeJitil
Assistance Administration (LEAA) and had begun the practice dfi1
furnishing ~ederal money to states for anti-crime activity. Th(
oft-reorgamzed LEAA was to be restructured again in 1980 but tfie_· 1
1
federal government's concern with "crime" continued. '
The 1968 reform effort was not the first address to the criminal!'
justice problem, any more than it will be the last. Three presidenti~I:
commissions made major national studies and recommended reforms. These were the Wickersham Commission in 1931 (National!
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement), the Katze11·
bach Commission in 1967 (President's Commission on Law Bit
forcement and the Administration of Justice), and the Peterson
Commission in 1973 (National Advisory Commission on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals). The last of these was oriented
toward specific remedial action; it developed standards and goals
for states and localities to consider. The states thereupon made
major efforts to develop their standards and goals, and much
reform activity has been and will be derived from these. It is
reasonable to expect at least one more nationwide evaluation dur· ·
I
ing the 1980s.
But the LEAA program was not only the first nationally
funded major effort against crime but was also the envelope within
which activity at all levels of government proceeded. The states of
course have primary responsibility for criminal justice, and nearly
1
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all the activity is carried out either at state or local levels; very little
is federal. Similarly, very little of the expenditure within a state on
criminal justice-about 3 to 5 percent during the late 1970s-was
federal money. Yet that federal money was highly significant, since
it was money available for innovation. The great bulk of state and
local funding necessarily went toward such relatively fixed costs as
police pay and court and prison operation. Moreover, the LEAA
created a criminal justice infrastructure which got research done,
stimulated dissemination of knowledge, and encouraged mutual
cooperation within the system.
During its brief existence, LEAA had attracted much criticism. Because it was national and visible, when crime did not
vanish despite LEAA's work, some people accused it of having
failed. More realistically, there indeed were some vulnerabilities,
such as massive, fitfully changing regulations and guidelines. Congress had legislated minutely what LEAA must administer, and no
President had yet lent it the weight of his active support. In any
case, however well or poorly LEAA had functioned as an agency, it
would have been grossly unfair to blame it for not stamping out
crime. The domestic police power is exercised at municipal and
county levels. The criminal laws are nearly all state laws, and the
courts which try violations are established by the states. The jails
are generally county, and the prisons are state institutions. The
leverage the federal agency could have with all these was really
rather limited. Underneath all of these efforts there are some basic
intractabilities about crime and such elemental ignorance of the
causes of crime that the slow progress in reducing crime must be
recognized as inevitable.
Nevertheless, it is to the LEAA program that perhaps the
most significant advance in criminal justice must be credited. In
1968, few people appreciated that the police, the courts, and corrections, plus some others, were so interdependent as to really
constitute a single criminal justice system. Since then, however,
the legislation, the money, and the way LEAA operated brought a
high percentage of criminal justice leaders in each state to a recognition of how their responsibilities and activities interacted with
and affected those of other such leaders. LEAA programs had
brought people together, induced them to communicate, and stimulated degrees of coordination unknown a decade ago but highly
beneficial to the public interest.
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These autonomous criminal justice leaders had come under
intense pressures created by overloads - the soaring crime rate
was the source of everyone's difficulty- and because their own
resources were so strained, no one gave thought to helping others
in the criminal justice field. Then LEAA gathered groups together
so that police chiefs could see prosecutors' problems, and judges
could grasp wardens' problems, and so on, while officials at state
levels could better understand the needs and capabilities at local
levels, and vice versa. A way was provided for the system to draw
closer together in some sort of cooperative coordination. Each
leader presently saw ways he could be helped by and could help
others, gaining a large return from a modest investment. Slowlyand with a long way yet to go - the system began to work as a
system.
LEAA's achievement was through state and substate 1 1•0 g
. .
.
..
pann
act1v1ty. The 1968 law required, as pr~cond1t1on for federal funds,
that each state create a State Planmng Agency (SPA) u d r the
· governmg
· board , t he SPA was to have ancouncil
e
governor. As its
with people from all levels of government and all components in
criminal justice. Every state promptly did so, and began doing
some approximation of the "comprehensive planning" required.
While the full-time planners were struggling with that part, the
people on the council (and corresponding groups at substate levels)
were learning in detail about other criminal justice activities besides their own. They were creating networks of communication,
establishing broader-based support, and edging steadily toward ,
appreciation of the system-wide view-with its need for priorities,
for coordination, for analysis of alternatives.
Each state, of course, followed its own path, and their individual experiences and results were therefore unique. Some-such
as Virginia, California, and Michigan-progressed far toward real
coordination, even though the autonomy of, for example, tocal
sheriffs and county courts, which is so fundamental to our governmental system, also made coordination hard to achieve. some
states are in earlier stages but progressing in worthwhile directions.
The distinctive personalities of each state ensured distinctiveness
also in the modes of, say, doing coordinated planning for long-term
needs for corrections facilities. Even so, in every state, more
coordination was seen in the criminaljustice picture than there was
formerly. This is beneficial and promising, and it has been stimu-
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lated by federal leadership and nourished through the LEAA programs.
Some critics say that of the two chief objectives of criminal
justice reform, crime reduction and system improvement, the
LEAA program had achieved results only in system improvement,
whereas crime reduction is the one which the public wanted and
needed. Other observers hold that whether or not some reduction
occurred, improving the system was itself worthy, not least because it increased the respect for law, yielded better treatment of
victims and witnesses, and made more effective and economical
use of public funds. The fact remained that crime rates continued
to rise.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROBLEMS
Having noted that reform is under way, some of the existing
problems will be considered. The list below is only representative
and is by no means offered as complete or necessarily comprising
the most urgent problems.
DIFFUSION In the United States, responsibility for
OF RESPONSIBILITY criminal justice is bewilderingly dif-

fuse. The states possess most responsibility in the first instance,
and have transmitted varying shares of power to lower levels. In
general, most police power is at city level, prosecutors generally
function at county level, courts are mostly county and state, jails
are county or sometimes city, and prisons are state-operated. But
the exceptions and special cases are many, and as demographic and
socioeconomic changes occur,jurisdictions are sometimes shifted.
There are more than 40,000 public agencies in the criminal justice
··system", and the bulk of them are essentially autonomous. Many
of the leaders are themselves elected officials - sheriffs, district
attorneys, many judges, most state attorneys general- and feel
responsive to the people, not to the county commission or the
governor. Most others report to elected local officials, whose autonomy is well known. Judicial independence is central to the
American democratic system. Most Americans, for that matter,
seem to feel that local control of police is also. These separations of
powers bolster the peoples' liberties, but they also fragment the
responsibility for domestic security and make integrated functioning extremely hard to achieve.

29

a.rs of
than ten ye ndi\NEFFECT\VENESS OF Even after more .
and eil'e 5 of
ANTI-CRIME PROGRAMS intensified attention l the r~te the
ture plus much hard work by conscientious peoP e, nd thef\05
viol~nt crime have generally continued to rise. He~e:Cteriorit13ge,
pace may slow, but improvements seem few an h. ng bl.lt dto \
many. Recidivism has seemed impervious to everyt ; e,<.Po~e005 , 1
0
for offenders under forty offend again, whether or n to pf15 fo!
.. rehabilitative'' programs. While more people went e J:1ladetr0l,
crime still increased. Now and then, exicted claims arr1ce pi lY
great success in some new technique of probation or po 0 d sitllP
but closer attention has to date deflated these claims a
lengthened the list of what is known not to work.
. 5 1.lll'

.

rnatll de' ,

LIMITED What will work to reduce crune ~~b little ot 1
COMPREHENSION known. Changes are proposed wtdatadotl U.l \
veloped, objective backing, since the research and test asl.lre ~ 0t
exist in the criminal justice field to show that a given rnesif1lph' ~f 1
likely produce a certain set of results. The processes are. idetlt c.t, \
0
10
yet well understood. Part of the trouble is the difficultY aose-i -JI'
ing key variables when studying human behavior, for
\l~e~
effect relationships remain obscure. The root of the prob \a.st tO
ever, is that little research had been undertaken until th:a.cti"~ot1'
years-per?aps partl~ because the field had not beeo att actitl ~o
research-one?ted social scientists, and partly because tt,.ese t 41 e ·.
ers. had noth'discovered the value of energetic
. Rand p. J. 41'\S tti.i,e .
pomts .are ighly significant, and various
ogrtlw at v·,
been aimed at meeting them. A further
LEAA pr eefl tb \lltlt
fragmentation of the criminal justice sy obstacle has b ed e"\et11'
ing the results of routine operations s~em has hamper ttl sY 5 cot'"
which were devised separately for· 0 match up da 0 tt· \'J.j
sequently, it has been ingenuity, int:~~tnPle, is diffiCwtiic\l ~tt-t
behind most proposals for change, ra~':n, and faitb . AS ~.,
deal of energy and resources is now g ~ than researcll cticil
1
search, however. Norval Morris said in ° ~& toward pr~ a.tlot !e"
five or ten years, we will earn substa=·id~\979* that, tfl tbiS fl~
search. In the meantime, however, cas~a\ Payoffs froflld\ed 1l
programs decided.
s tnust be ha"

\efll'

ti

l

LEAA -pm1sored Conference
•sp,,,,king to '!"
. -s Virginia.
Control. held Ill Arl111gro11.

OIJ ,,.

er•.,,,e \
e Stare of Th<' Art ,n
•

\

30
J
/

MANPOWER Throughout the criminal justice system, one
DIFFICULTIES sees some splendid people, but also some seri-

ous inadequacies in manpower quality, quantity, training, and
sometimes motivation. During the first decade of reform, federal
and state programs have aimed to rectify these by such improvements as better selection, pay raises, and especially training
and education. The police area shows remarkable improvement in
some localities and probably at least some improvement
everywhere. Of course, the police, being highly visible, disciplined, and sustained by group cohesion, ought to respond to
directed change. But the police officer tends toward the status quo,
experiences daily the diversity of real life, and hence skeptically
views the untried theory. So reform is incomplete, and still meets
obstacles.
In the courts, one sees wide variations in skill and attitude.
Invoking judicial independence, some judges (mainly at county
levels) resist such management improvements as the use of court
administrators and standardized data handling. Many trial lawyers, according to the U.S. chi~f justice and others, are not fully
competent at courtroom techmques, and so a wave of remedial
training is under way.
The jails and prisons show the widest gap between the desirable personnel situation and the actual. Low pay, low status, and an
atmosphere often of dehumanized degradation do not naturally
attract uniformly splendid recruits. Until recently, corrections
people often felt unsupported, had low states of training, and were
given skimpy budgets, but improvement in these areas is generally
underway. The cultural gap is a special difficulty, however, with
many inmates, but too few correctional officers, being urban
minority members.
The potential benefits from achieving in courts and corrections a degree of manpower improvement comparable to that in the
police area seem to be many. These two areas have longer contact
with offenders and more opportunity to shift offenders away from
crime. Moreover, many of the new or improved programs in both
will require ad~iti?nal peo~le o~ greater potential with better train.
At this pomt it seems mev1table that some new programs will
mg.
fail and be discarded, not because they lack merit, but simply
because they were not manned suitably.
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POLICE When criminal justice reform began, both th~
1
IMPROVEMENT perceived difficulties and the visible opportt1!3 ties were in the police area. The thought was that since police
handle crime, an increase in crime called for reinforcing the police·
Moreover, the rationally organized police forces could react '
promptly when provided new resources and could begin the itnprovement process without delay. In the early years, consequentlY,
police got strong priority from federal, state, and local go'Vemments. As experience and understanding accumulated, however, it became clear both that courts and corrections needed much
more attention, and that a system-wide view should govern
priorities. Of great significance is the fact that at LEAA's Mid-1979
Conference* for senior criminaljustice leadership of all states, the
police were scarcely mentioned, and all sessions were devoted to
other areas.
Actually, many problems remain in the police area, but much
experimentation and analysis are also under way. Few of the
thousands of small police forces (under ten officers) have been
consolidated, but some common-servicing occurs. Although
minority representation on police forces is generally insufficient,
many forces sustain strong minority-recruiting efforts and inch
ahead. Community relations remains a troubled area, but many
cities are progressing well. lraining programs, certification standards, and communications capabilities are generally much better.
Techniques for such activities as patrol, crisis intervention, and
evidence handling have been the subjects of much experimentati_on
and development. Results are widely disseminated, so that pobce
organizations can more easily stay abreast of the state of the art1

COURT Each state has created, over the years, its own
IMPROVEMENT distinctive system(s) of courts. All are separate
and independent from the rest of government, except that the
money comes from legislative bodies, and such basic conditions as
structure, size, pay scales, and tenure are fixed by legislative and
executive action. Hence, the judiciary can recommend but not
decide whether, for example, all courts should be state courts or
Whether some should be county and city ones. The recent trend has
~een toward consolidating courts into one state system, but sometimes the central management is loosely applied.
•see previous footnote.
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A stronger trend is the introduction of "court administrators"
to relieve judges of managerial duties. Although often resisted
initially, especially at county levels, these administrators usually
come to be viewed as great assets.
Courts have not yet achieved, in most instances, records and
data systems which are rational, uniform, and usable by the criminal justice system as a whole. Judges vary in willingness to adapt,
and some assert that data management threatens judicial independence. The variety of data systems remains troublesomely
great.
Dockets are still crowded almost everywhere. While many
states have reduced delays to the point that cases come to trial
routinely within sixty days, in some others trials are not promptly
held. Plea bargaining remains usual, occurring in from 65 to 85
percent of felony cases.
Judges sentence convicted offenders, but do so in conformity
with laws which govern sentencing. A major trend is under way in
many states, usually led by legislators rather thanjudges, changing
these laws away from indeterminate to determinate terms. Lying
behind this is not only a growing attitude of "lock'-em'up-andthrow-away-the-key," but also the virtual abandonment of the
belief that prisons can rehabilitate inmates. The indeterminate
sentencing concept was linked with the rehabilitation concept. The
idea was that the judge would set the minimum and maximum
terms far apart, which let the warden and the parole board key the
inmate's release to his progress in the rehabilitation process.
Lately, however, many legislatures have begun enacting more specific penalties; a statute might set, for example, three to five years
as the penalty for an offense formerly punishable by one year to
life. Many judges are sensitive about having their discretion thus
constricted, and some evasive maneuvering by them is predictable.
CORRECTIONS Such a shift to determinate sentencing will have
IMPROVEMENT definite impact on prison population numbers,

even though legislators do not customarily check with corrections
officials before voting. The shift is one reflection of new emphasis
upon the concept that the purpose of corrections should be simply
punishment, or perhaps punishment plus protection of the public.
(A fourth possible purpose of corrections-besides rehabilitation,
punishment, and protecting the public - is deterrence, but its
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commissions as well as the legislature competing with the governor
for control over state prisons and state police.
The nation reacted to increased crime by creating a federal
agency, LEAA, and equipping it not only with research and dissemination services but primarily with federal funds to grant to
states. Federal legislation induced each state to have an SPA which
LEAA encourages to take a system-wide view and which allocates
most LEAA money within the state. Federal leverage has brought
together, in state-level councils and substate boards, senior representatives of all the criminal justice components and all levels of
government. They log-roll a great deal, but many of them also
come gradually, to a broader comprehension of the overall criminal
justice system of which their individual activities are a part. Thus
they, as well as the SPA planners, can better perceive priority needs
and deficiencies in the system.
One great shortcoming of all this is that the overwhelming bulk
of criminal justice activity is funded by state and local legislative
bodies, which are not automatically engaged in that process. Some
states have drawn the legislature into close and fruitful contact
with the process, but most have not. Some states have caused the
SPA to overwatch (owing to the separation of powers, it cannot
control) all criminal justice activity in the state, but others focus
the SPA's attention on merely the federally funded portion.
Efforts are periodically made to eliminate or shrink LEAA, to
pass federal funds directly to local governments, and otherwise to
adjust the way federal leadership is applied.
IS VIOLENT At one point, some observers wondered if
CRIME SUBSIDING the crime problem might not simply begin
to fade away, carrying with it the public's willingness to support
expensive programs far from fruition. In a notable October 1973
Atlantic article, updated in Wilson's Thinking about Crime. James
Q. Wilson and Robert L. DuPont had suggested that the epidemic
increase of crime could possibly be attributed primarily to the
post-World War II baby boom. After that population bulge passed
through the crime-prone fifteen to twenty-four age bracket, would
crime rates fall? By 1980, it had now passed, and the rates may have
stuttered a time or two but generally seem still rising. Charles
Silberman, in Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice. suggests that
the particular circumstances of the blacks, who are both the most
frequent offenders and most frequent victims, are especially rele-
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vant. He says, "What has happened in the last fifteen years, in
good measure, is that the cultural devices that kept black violence
under control have broken down, and that new cultural controls
have not yet emerged." Also to be noted is that crime rates derive
from crime reporting, which is done more fully now than beforeexcept for murders, which show the same rising rates. As yet it is
not clear whether crime rates are, one day, to decline at last,. or
whether there are powerful tendencies which will steadily brmg
more alienation, lawlessness, violence.
IS WHITE COLLAR CRIME To the newspapers and TV, violent
TOO UTILE NOTICED? crime is what seems to count.
~any Americans are now wondering, however, if the rates of
mcrease in white collar crime much of it undetected, may not be
' embezzlers, sticky-fingered s~le s
greater. There have always been
clerks, and businesses operating outside the law. But the questi~n
now is whether with computerization and other new intricacies, 10
an atmosphere of changing social values, there may be far more
e~onomic crime than is visible. Quite apart from the matter of more
vigorous pursuit of undetected crime is that of how discovered
~rimes are handled. Some flagrant cases ofingenious thieves en~ermg computer systems to steal millions or of businesses defrauding
customers on a grand scale have led to' sentences milder than fior a
bank robber stealing a few ~housand dollars. This raises questions
of equity and public confidence.
WHAT SHOULD Discontent with corrections as now pracCORRECTIONS DO? ticed seems to be nearly universal. ~he
Peterson Commission, judging confinement to be dehuma~iztn:
and bound to obstruct the integration of a released offender mto
productive, peaceful relationship with society, had urged a ban on
b ui·1d·mg ~ny more large prisons. Instead, it held, pro~at1on
·
antd
commumty-based corrections should be used extensively. B_u
community resistance to these has been powerful, and meanwhile
the numbers of convicted offenders still mount. Knowledge about
the effects of corrections programs has been exc~e.dingly rudimentary, and is only now beginning to approach usab1hty ~s the results
of LEAA-sponsored research begin to appear. It re~at~s to be se.en
how the new understanding we soon may expect wtll mteract with
t~e shift of public and political attitudes away from the rehabilitative purpose of corrections and toward the purpose of punishment
or just desert. In practical terms, large prisons are expensive, and
most states now have overcrowded prisons.
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INEQUITY Ideally, the judicial process and especially its
IN SENTENCING climax in the courtroom should communicate

to everyone a sense of fairness, so that each individual seeing it
may be strengthened in a belief that the system is indeed just. But
people convicted for similar offenses often get strikingly dissimilar
sentences. Many are deeply antagonized by what they take to be
the capriciousness of the court. Class and racial patterns seem to
emerge. But judges and corrections officials have long insisted that
automatic, uniform sentences fail to accommodate the great variations in offenses and offenders and would therefore be grossly
unjust. Moreover, new research, such as Silberman reports in
Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice, suggests there is far more
consistency and equitableness in sentencing than is communicated. Both judicial groups and legislatures have been giving intense attention to the sentencing process. Among the reforms
considered, in addition to determinate sentencing and flat sentencing, are sentencing guidelines, sentencing institutes and councils,
appellate reviews of sentencing, and legislated rules about the
factors to be considered and written explanations by the judge who
weighed them.
DECRIMINALIZATION A number of offenses are being called vic-

timless by some observers. Drunkenness,
use (not sale) of marijuana, gambling, and prostituion are usually
among them. Various proposals are made periodically to decriminalize some of these offenses, one reason being to cut down the
workload of courts and corrections and, to a lesser degree of the
police. Some of the resistance to such proposals is on the grounds
that to do so would be offensive to public concepts of morality.
Then there is a question of treatment alternatives to arrest. Ultimately these appear to be political questions, subject to attitudinal
and demographic changes.
A~IOR The police are highly visible to the public.
POLICE BEH M
Their activities, at least at the all-

important individual level, are the least patterned of any in the
criminal justice system. The police officer not only enforces the
law but keeps order. As government's representative on the spot.
he must cope with the frictions and tragedies of every day life.
Necessarily, he has some discretionary authority-for example.
whether to arrest or to warn. Often under pressure, he must decide
swiftly, seldom with full information.
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Yet the way the police officer decides, acts, and speaks will
reflect, particularly for people in lower socioeconomic strata, the
presence and the capability for service or for repression of all levels
of government. To perhaps most Americans, the police officer is
government, for it is he whom they see, he who obliges their
conformance to the law. His manner, therefore, has much potential
influence on the attitudes people have toward government.
Whether a citizen regards it as his government or theirs is affected
by police behavior.
There is wide diversity in how various Americans regard the
local police. The stereotype is of the well-off suburban whites, who
see the police officer as a helpful friend, by contrast with the
poverty-level urban blacks, who see him as a hostile bully, even
enemy. As the readings suggest, the actuality is far more complicated. But many localities do sometimes have tense relationships
between police and minority groups. Efforts to improve mutual
understanding are frequent and of mixed success. The same seems
true of the identification and correction of racist practices within
some police forces. Reform is under way but incomplete. And it
seems vitally important.

SECURITY AS THE FOUNDATION OF
GOVERNMENT
Laws are not self-enforcing. Perhaps in most modern
societies, most people will ordinarily obey most laws simply because they feel it right to do so. But for extraordinary circumstances and for the less scrupulous, in order to achieve consistent
obedience, some motivation must be supplied. Hence, governments use some system of reward and punishment, but the
recent as well as the historical experience of mankind assure us
that still more is needed. A government, in order to protect its own
people from each other, must therefore apply coercive force. It
may be sad, but it is so.
In America, we see this coercive force as the criminal justice
system with police officers as the visible manifestation.
Any experienced police leader, however, will attest that police
resources at best can deal with only modest quantities of disorder
beyond the day-to-day routine. When a greater disturbance occurs
-a flood, a tornado, a significant riot-local police are too few and
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must get help. Reinforcements from nearby police, sheriff's departments, and state police can extend their capability only modestly and briefly. Hence, in such situations, the state governor will
often call upon his military force, the army National Guard. While
most people perceive the National Guard as a federal force, they
really are not federal except in very unusual circumstances, such
as declared wars. What they are is state militia, ordinary citizens
with regular jobs who are also part-time so1diers, ready to become
full time at the governor's command.
When a governor calls some or all of his state militia to active
duty to cope with a flood or riot, they are used in aid of the civil
authority; martial law and other supercessions of the civil authority are very seldom needed. Such is the American military
ethos that these soldiers (and the regulars too) take special pride in
the rapidity with which they can show the civil authority a situation
of restored order and can fade from the scene.
Two things here are unique to America. One is that the military
have never undertaken to usurp political control. Civil control of
the military is an enduring fact, and military control of the government is simply not a possibility, let alone a threat. Elsewhere in the
world it happens, but not here. The second unique feature is that
the principal military foundation of civil government is militiacontrolled below the national government level. Elsewhere, the
rescue of civil authority in storm or riot is by the national government's troops.
In 1967-68 many American cities experienced civil disturbances so large and violent that National Guard and active army
troops had to be used to restore order. Perhaps all such mass
disorder may be behind us, but it is possible that the worst is yet to
come. There may be some unpredictable combination of energy
restrictions, economic distress, urban discontent, political terrorism, mistrust of authority, feverish self-interest, and other factors which could push large numbers of Americans above the riot
flashpoint. In some particular circumstances, adversity could also
cause Americans to unite, but it is sobering to recall public behavior in the 1979 gasoline lines.
If the U.S. should face new levels of civil turmoil, which is not
inconceivable during the 1980s and 1990s, not only the security
forces but even government itself would be sorely stressed. For if
civil government, using its police resources and aid from the military, cannot swiftly restore order, anarchy results. The strongest
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and the cruelest then would exert power over others , without
accountability. As history shows, populations will not long tolerate
such anarchy but will sooner cede their freedoms to new, more
repressive government.
If U.S. national security prospects were altogether bright,
large scale domestic disorder would be less likely. But economic
interdependence generally and U .S. dependence on foreign oil
more particularly have expanded America's vulnerability. Meanwhile the Soviet Union has been investing heavily in military
power and the capability to project it. Some strategists are worried
that the USSR, either despite or perhaps because of a generational
change in leadership and serious domestic problems , might try
dangerously to exploit that strength. The threat these strategists
perceive is not direct attack but Soviet political action which use_s
military power as its fulcrum and aims at seriously harming Ame_n~an al~ies or the alliance relationship itself. Even if armed co~~ict
1s avoided, these strategists say, the economic as well as pohticaJ
consequences for t_he U.S. would be painful. If they are sufficiently
so, ~hese economic consequences could cause domestic effects
leading
. .
"TI to civil disorder, possibly to repress1on
o _as~ure the continuation of American freedoms, therefore,
t~e nation s first priority concern must be effective security, protded through the criminal justice system the national armed
orces, and the National Guard, which link~ them .
The prospects for America's future need not be as ominous as
these last paragraphs suggest. The nation has successfully faced
g:eat threats before. It is resilient and in th
h been responsive to national leadershi Be
'
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Each Nova participant is expected to submit in advance of
seminar discussion a 10- 15-page commentary dealing with three of
the following four topics:
l. Explain broadly the kind of system you believe should be
used to bring people into the U.S. armed forces, and the
reasons why you prefer that system.
2. Discuss the consequences and implications of Congress'
increased assertiveness in the national security field during
the 1970s.
3. Discuss the criminaljustice issue you believe deserves first
priority attention in your community or state, explaining
why it does.
4. Discuss some advantages and disadvantages of
community-based corrections, compared with incarcerating offenders in large remote institutions.
Required Reading

Brown, Seyom, An End to Grand Strategy, Foreign Policy.
Fall 1978, pp. 22-46.
Bundy, William P., Elements of Power, Foreign Affairs. October 1977, pp. 1-26.
Ellsworth, Robert F., and ADELMAN, Kenneth L., Foolish
Intelligence, Foreign Policy. Fall 1979, pp. 147-159.
Graham, Thomas R., Revolution in 'Irade Politics, Foreign
Policy. Fall 1979, pp. 49-63.
Harris, Richard, Crime in New York, New Yorker, September
26, 1977, pp. 56 et seq.
Hyland, William G., Brezhnev and Beyond, Foreign Affairs.
Fall 1979, pp. 51-66.
Lynn, Laurence E. Jr., Designing Public Policy: A Casebook
on The Role of Policy Analysis, Santa Monica, CA., Goodyear
Publishing Co., 1980. Chapters 1-2, 19-21.
Owen, Henry and Schultze, Charles (eds.), Setting National
Priorities: The Next Ten Years, Washington, Brookings, 1976.
Chapters 1-6.
Pechman, Joseph A., Setting National Priorities: Agenda for
the 1980s, Washington Brookings, 1980. Chapters l, 3, 9-15.
Ukles, Jacob B., Policy Analysis: Myth or Reality, P.A.R.,
May/June 1977, pp. 223-228.
Wilson, James Q., Thinking about Crime, (NY: Random
House, 1975).
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Supplementary Reading

For further reading in the national security field, one can find
abundant material in the average public library; even small colleges are likely to have reasonable collections of specialized material. The preeminent periodical is Foreign Affairs, published quarterly by the Council on Foreign Relations. Virtually every public
library has it. Besides containing much authoritative or scholarly
coverage of current and future problems, it also includes bibliographical assessments of the more significant recent books in the
international field. In recent years it has paid close attention to
international economic matters, but aside from questions of nuclear deterrence it devotes relatively little attention to strategic and
defense policy matters. To these topics the quarterly Foreign Policy does give more space. It is also deliberately sprightlier, more
open to the untested idea and to the younger writer. During its first
decade it has already earned high standing by the quality of its
often provocative treatments. But military policy matters have
more recently come to be covered with greater thoroughness,
although in somewhat more academic fashion, by the quarterly
International Security. In addition, there are dozens of specialized
periodicals, some oriented toward practitioners and others toward
scholars. Most have carved out a particular segment of the field to
deal with, as their titles usually indicate: Middle East Journal,
Army, Asian Survey, Air University Quarterly Review.
Books of high quality published each year in the national
security field number several hundred in English alone. Besides
the short descriptions of most of them in Foreign Affairs. brief
reviews of a lesser number can be found in the bimonthly Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science. As a
national review, the Wilson Quarterly undertakes broad coverage,
always includes some national security material. Besides offering
some highly discriminating book selections, it also routinely digests a number of articles from a wide range of sources.
Most journalism in the national security field is decidedly
undistinguished, usually playing up the sensational and applying a
snapshot approach. Curiously enough, the weekly New Yorker
occasionalJy has highly perceptive articles with admirable
perspective, but it does not pretend to more than intermittent
coverage. Much the soundest journalistic coverage appears in the
British Economist which, despite its name, is a newsweekly but

42

l

.i

one Written with comprehension, and an appreciation of i·nt
.
eractions, which its U.S. counterparts have not yet achieved.
. The criminal justice literature is far less developed and is al
highly uneven in quality and coverage. Only for a decade have so
.
.
I b
any
significant numbers of skilled peop e een researching and wn·t·
.
f . .
mg
1n this field. Moreover, the concept o cnmmal justice as one
system is relatively new; the tendency I?ersists for practitioners to
see themselves only as part of corrections, or courts, or law enforcement. As yet no periodicals have approached the stature of a
Foreign Policy. let alone Foreign Affairs. But many periodicals do
cover aspects of criminal justic~. Amon~ them are the Journal of
Criminal Justice, Law and Society Review, the Police Chief. the
American Journal of Corrections, and a number of university law
reviews. But the coverage of issue~, as distinct from technical
questions, is perhaps broader, if ~o.re scattered, in the
nonspecialized literature; dozens of penodicals-Pub/ic Interest,
Harper's, and the New York Times Magazine, for example-from
time to time publish articles in the field. Ebony devoted its entire
August 1979 issue to the problem of crime in the black community.
As to books, Charles E. Silberman's Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice (NY: Random House, 1978) not only covers the field
and recent research more thoroughly than others to date, but also
contains a useful bibliography: James Q. Wilson's Thinking About
Crime (NY: Basic Books, 1975), however, treats the basic issues
with perhaps greater clarity and balanced breadth. While the quantity of books, monographs, and reports produced annually remains
well short of that in the national security field, it has lately been
growing; more importantly, the quality is also improving.
One of the main functions of LEAA is to develop and disseminate new knowledge and understanding in the criminal justice
field. Toward that end it operates a National Criminal Justice
Reference Service (NCJRS), which publishes bibliographical material and otherwise assists research. Visitors will find NCJRS at
1015 20th Street NW, Suite 400, in Washington; its mailing address
is NCJRS, Box 6000, Rockville, Maryland 20850.
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UNIT2

ECONOMICPOLICY,ENERGY,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Herbert C. Morton
The three topics of economic policy, energy, and the environment are much more closely related than might seem apparent at
first glance, and perhaps the best way to appreciate their interdependence it to put them in historical perspective. Since all are
policy issues that have become important comparatively recently,
the span of history is less than a half century.

I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Employment and Stabilization Policies
The growing understanding that government has a continuing
and major role to play in the operation of the American economy
was officially and formally recognized after World War II when
memories of the Depression of the 1930s were still fresh. The
national government had imposed rationing, price controls, and
other emergency regulations during wartime emergencies even
before World War II, and during the 1930s it had intervened in the
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economy to build public works and provide jobs on an unprecedented scale. But historically, it had acted more out of desperation
than from any clear understanding of how the economy works. The
uniqueness of the Employment Act of 1946 is that it reflected a
national consensus and that it spelled out for the first time and
established a federal commitment to the maintenance of a high
level of economic activity on a continuing basis and not just in an
emergency:
The Congress declares that it is the continuing policy and
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means consistent with its needs and obligations
and other essential considerations of national policy, with
the assistance and cooperation of industry, agriculture,
labor, and state and local government to coordinate and
utilize all its plans, functions and resources for the purposes of creating and maintaining, in a manner calculated
to foster and promote free competitive enterprise and the
general welfare, conditions under which there will be
afforded useful employment opportunities, including self
employment, for those able, willing, and seeking to work,
and to promote maximum employment, production, and
purchasing power. (60 Stat. 33, Sec. 2, 1946)
Less formally, the nation's major economic goals were widely
described as jobs for all who wanted to work in a growing economy
that would provide for a rising level of living. Later, as a result of
postwar inflation and another burst of price increase during the
Korean War, greater emphasis began to be given to the goal of price
stability implied by the act's concern for purchasing power.
. The Employment Act of 1946 reflected not only a determination to avoid future depressions but also the belief among some
policy makers and their advisers that tools were finally available to
make governmental intervention a constructive force. The acceptance of this governmental role was linked to a theoretical explanation of how the economy functions, and to the growing availability
0 ~ statistical data that could provide the basis for policy decisions.
Dis~greements persisted on specific policy objectives, on the effectiveness of alternative policy instruments and on the amount of
reliance that could be placed on market forces, but there was
nonetheless a broad consensus on the analytical framework.
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The framework utilizes a broad set of tools that were
fashioned largely out of the theories of John Maynard Keynes
whose influential book of 1936, The General Theory of Employ~
ment, Interest, and Money, revolutionized the thinking of most
economists, the teaching of economics, and the application of
economic ideas to policy making. (For a readable introduction to
Keynes's intellectual contributions, see The Worldly Philosophers
by Robert L. Heilbroner; Herbert Stein assigns Keynes a smaller
role in his study The Fiscal Revolution in America.) For purposes
of this discussion, the essential point is that Keynes demonstrated
that the economy may not be self-adjusting, as traditional economic theory had long insisted, but that it could settle into an
equilibrium at a level of activity far below its potential, with unused
capacity and high rate of unemployment. This thesis provided a
rationale for government intervention.
At the same time that the General Theory was gaining attention, the United States was making substantial progress in setting
up its system of national income accounts. These now provide
periodic reports on the gross national product (GNP), (which is the
total value of goods and services the economy produces), and or
other measures such as national income, (which is the product left
over after an allowance has been made for (a) the capital equipment
that has been used up, and (b) for manufacturers· sales and excise
taxes that are added to the price of the product before it is sold).
For a description of the national income accounts, see a standard
text such as Paul Samuelson's Economics, Chapter 10, .. The National Income Accounts". The national income and product accounts are reported quarterly in the government periodical Survey
of Current Business, making it possible to keep score on the economy's performance. The analysis of changes in these accounts,
using primarily Keynesian tools, is an essential ingredient of policy
recommendations.
Other governmental statistics were greatly improved during
the 1930s and 1940s - the surveys of employment and unemployment and the price indexes issued by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. It is surprising to recall that unemployment figures durng the
1930s were rough estimates based on very fragmentary evidence.
Not until after World War II did the government establish the
monthly current population survey covering some 50,000 households, which is the basis for the familiar and statistically sophisticated monthly reports on employment and unemployment. (For
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further information on these and other statistics on productivity,
earnings, strike activities, and so on, see the biennial BLS Handbook of Labor Statistics and the BLS Handbook of Methods,
which explain how these data are gathered and their reliability.
Complementing the development of new economic tools and
better statistics was a technological breakthrough - the development of high-speed computers, which made possible the rapid
manipulation of vast quantities of data.
A new era of macroeconomics had dawned-the product of a
new theoretical apparatus, an enlarged, more developed body of
statistics to help guide policy making, and a growing consensus on
the role of government in the economy symbolized by the Employment Act of 1946. And this took place only some three decades
ago.

Environmental Policy
For at least fifteen years after the role of macroeconomic
policy became accepted, questions of environmental policy were
being considered only by a very few economists and policy makers, supported in some areas by conservationists, who had long
been concerned with soil erosion, degradations of forests, and
despoiling of scenic treasures. Most policy makers did not view the
environment as a distinct area for public concern. In 1960, for
example, the report on Goals for Americans prepared by a group of
distinguished citizens for President Eisenhower, took no notice of
the environmental problem. Rachel Carson's Silent Spring (1966)
alerted the reading public to the dangers of indiscriminate use of
chemicals, but strong opposition blunted any moves toward a
major policy change. In 1968, the Brookings Institution published
Agenda for the Nation, a far-reaching discussion of issues that
would confront the next president. Each chapter was devoted to a
major problem facing the incoming administration. But of the 18
chapters, not one was devoted to environmental policy, though by
1968 env.ironmental concerns were being widely discussed and the
beginnings of a federal policy were in the making. Within two
years, the National Environmental Protection Act, enacted 1970
marked the beginning of a broad federal approach to environmentai
policy (though there had been piecemeal bits of legislation related
to environmental concerns, particularly air and water pollution). It
was followed by the Air Quality Amendments of 1970, the Water
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Poll~tion Control Amendments of 1972, and other legislation, includmg more recently, the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976.
Collectively, these stamp the 1970s as the environmental policy
decade.

Energy Policy
As a major focus of national concern, energy policy is even of
more recent vintage, though the specter of depletion of natural
resources, including fossil fuels, has been lurking around since the
early nineteenth century with the Malthusian warning of the tendency of population to grow at a geometric rate, and thus to outrun
the world's supply of resources. World War II and the Korean War,
which were enormous drains on the world's stock of fossil fuel and
minerals, triggered another round of concern with a natural resources policy. It led to the appointment of the President's Commission on Materials Policy (the so-called Paley Commission) and
its impressive assessment, Re sources for Freedom. Subsequently,
in 1952 with support from the Ford Foundation, a research center,
Resources for the Future, was established in Washington to study
resource policy, including energy policy on a continuing basis. The
notion that there was a major energy issue for policy makers to
consider dido 't strike home to the public, however, until the embargo imposed in the fall of 1973 by the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC). The long lines at gas stations, the
quadrupling of the price of crude petroleum, and growing concern
about the economic costs and the physical hazards of nuclear
power-all suddenly made energy front-page news. Although the
crisis of 1973-74 appeared short-lived to the public, the underlying
problems of supply and price were not, and a dual problem arose.
Policy makers had to determine not only what policies the United
State should adopt over the next few years to assure an adequate
and secure source of energy at reasonable prices, but they discovered that they also had to determine how to persuade the public
that energy is indeed a serious problems-a difficult task at a time
when gasoline and other fuels appear to be plentiful. Although the
era of cheap energy, which had been an essential ingredient of the
country's enormous economic growth in the preceding half century
or more, is over, nearly fifty percent of the public (according to a
1977 Gallup Poll) are not aware that the United States has to import
oil to meet energy needs.
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The New Challenge to Economic Policy
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II.

Issues in Macroeconomic Policy

The Tools

Government influences economic activity by the so-called
automatic built-in stabilizers, by discretionary policies, and by
economic controls.
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The automatic stabilizers are, first, the federal corporate and
personal income taxe~. Duri?g periods of rising business activity,
these taxes take an mcreasmg proportion of money out of the
economy, thus reducing the pace of expansion; during business
slowdowns, they take out a smaller proportion, thus helping to
cushion the economy from the full effects of the slowdown. Other
automatic stabilizers include federal payments for unemployment
insurance, which increase during a recession and decline in periods
of high economic activity, and Social Security payments, which
remain rather stable despite an increase or fall-off in economic
activity. Such payments help sustain purchasing power and economic activity, and, like the changes in tax revenue, they go into
effect automatically without the need for any congressional or
executive action. Wilfred Lewis's study, Federal Fiscal Policy in
the Postwar Recessions, showed that the automatic stabilizers
helped substantially to offset the loss of income caused by the four
economic downturns in the period between World War II and the
Vietnam War.
Discretionary policies are of two types. One isfiscal policythe use of the government's taxing and spending powers to maintain high employment and stable purchasing power. Generally, if
the federal government increases its spending or reduces taxes, or
both, it will stimulate economic activity. Ifit raises taxes or reduces
its spending, it will curb economic activity. (For a fuller discussion
of these generalizations see Samuelson or any other standard text.)
But note one essential assumption which is implicit in the foregoing
statements, and which is a significant qualification-that all other
things remain equal (the economists' familiar qualification expressed in the Latin phrase, ceteris paribus).
A second instrument of discretionary policy is monetary po/icy, which refers to the leverage that the Federal Reserve Board
can exert on the economy by changing the re discount rate (the rate
it charges Federal Reserve banks when they want to borrow from
the central bank) by open market operations and by varying the
amount of reserves that a bank must retain. (See Samuelson, and
G. L. Bach, Making Monetary and Fiscal Policy.)
A third type of federal policy is the use of direct and indirect
controls. Direct controls include rationing and price controls that
are common in wartime, controls over installment borrowing that
have been enacted at various times, and the 1971 freeze of wages
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and prices (so-called Phase I) imposed by the Nixon administration. Indirect controls (which really are not controls in the formal
sense) include (1) the so-called moral suasion that the Federal
Reserve has used to encourage bankers to behave in ways it
considered desirable and (2) wage and price guidelines. In 1962, for
example, the Kennedy Administration announced the so-called
guideposts policy. It suggested that wage increases should generally be held to 3.2 percent, approximately the rate at which productivity had been growing in the economy, on the premise that
increases of that amount would not add to inflationary pressures.
Proponents of the guideposts approach credited it with an important role in the maintenance of price stability during the 1962-65
period, but this view is not universally shared. 1

Effectiveness of Macro Policies
The relative effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy during
the first twenty-five years after World War II and the limitations of
these policy tools are analyzed in Bach's book. In general, the
lessons of the experience described in the book are still applicable·
But it should be added that subsequent experience with macroeconomic policy has made economists less optimistic about the
capacity of fiscal and monetary policy to keep the economy on a
growth path while keeping prices under control. The pressure to
meet the nation's defense needs in the late 1960s, while maintaining
the expansion of peaceful economic activities, led to a competition
for economic resources which caused higher prices.
In 1971 the government froze prices and devalued the dollar in
an effort to slow down inflation, reduce unemployment, and reduce the balance-of-payments deficit. The next year was a good
one: both unemployment and the inflation rate declined. Then the
~ecession of 1974-75 ensued. It was exacerbated by the four-fold
mcrease in oil prices, which also fed inflationary pressures, and for
the first time the nation faced the two problems at the same timerampant inflation and rising unemployment.
Such a combination confounded the traditional assumptions
about macro economic policy. For years policy makers had assumed that they had a tradeoff to contend with. They could (1)
iThe lfOvernment also has enacted a wide range of other economic rel[ulations
covermg f.ayment of minimum wages, airline rates, rules go,•erning the trading in
c'!mmod1~1es, ~nd so o~,, but these regulations lie omside the scope of this study
smce their maJor goal ,s not related to the level of economic activity.
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st!mulate the. eco~omy and reduce unemployment by tolerating
slightly more mflation, or (2) keep prices stable and live with a little
more unemployment. For about two decades a rate of unemployment of 4 percent was assumed to be consistent with a reasonably
stable price level- that is, a price level that wouldn't rise more
than 1 or 2 percent a year. If prices were rising at a faster rate, the
level of economic activity could be cut by macroeconomic policy
at the cost of a higher rate of unemployment. But a situation in
which high unemployment and high rates of price increases
coexisting created a different problem and kindled new debates
among economists as well as among policy makers about what
might be done.
The behavior of the economy in the mid-1970s was a humbling
experience for believers in the efficacy of governmental intervention. Some of the best-known exponents of discretionary fiscal
policy conceded that perhaps they had been overly optimistic
about the possibilities of fiscal policy during the 1960s. They also
acknowledged that a new problem was posed by the existence of
inflation and unemployment at the same time.
What caused the persistence of inflation and high unemployment at the same time? Several contributing factors have been
identified. One is the changing composition of the labor force. The
bulge in the teen-age population - which resulted from the baby
boom of the 1950s-greatly increased the proportion of persons in
the labor force in age groups that traditionally have had high
unemployment rates because they are untrained and are experimenting with different types ofjobs. At the same time, the proportion of women who have entered the labor force {which increased
from about 33 percent of working-age women in 1946 to about 46
percent in the mid-I970s) had a similar result.
Another contributing factor was the increasing rigidity of the
economic system in resisting downward adjustments of both prices
and wages. When economic activity slackened off, large corporations were able to hold the line on prices. Strong unions were
often able, even in slack times, to obtain wage increases in excess
of productivity gains.
Another factor was the impact of the OPEC oil embargo. The
ensuing increase in oil prices not only increased the cost of transportation and heating, but also of petrochemicals and many other
products that require petroleum in their production.
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The experience of the mid-I970s caused a reassessment of the
tentials of macroeconomic policy and more modesty in the
~~aims of economists about how soon the United States economy
·ght achieve a more tolerable level of unemployment (say, 5
m:rcent instead of the 4 percent target that had prevailed). Most
:conomists came to believe that the country will not achieve even a
5 percent unemploy~ent rate ~efore the mid-I980s. Still, the economic activists remained convinced that so long as the economy
was operating at less than full capacity, and with unemployment
running at 6 or 7 percent, there were grounds for pursuing discretionary policies to stimulate the economy. In short, there was
less than full agreement and more uncertainty, even among the
experts, as to what policies might be most effective in moving
toward the more complex goals.
Employment 'Jraining Policies
During the 1950s and 1960s there was a running debate among
economists over the best approach to reducing unemployment.
One group stressed what it called the need to combat "'structural
unemployment" - unemployment (a) that was especially high in
distressed areas, such as Appalachia, and in the central cities, as a
result of changes in technology and the movement of industry; and
(b) that arose because of the higher proportion of youths and
untrained minority workers in the labor force. The other group
argued that although there may be structural unemployment, it was
not the major problem. The major problem was the weakness of
aggregate demand. If the economy were growing rapidly enough,
they argued, workers would move away from depressed areas of
high employment, and youth and minority workers would be
drawn into jobs.
Over a period of time, the polarization of views faded, and
though economists still differ in the importance they attach to
monetary and fiscal policy on the one hand, and structural policies,
on the other, both approaches seem firmly established in government policy. The manpower programs established by the Labor
Department in the early 1960s sought to provide for both work
experience and training for youths and disadvantaged. These continue today under the (less sexist) title of employment training
programs. At the same time, efforts have been made to advance
opportunities for youth, women, and minority workers through
programs to help distressed areas and to reduce discrimination in
hiring and promotion.
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111.

Issues in Environmental Policy

National concern with environmental issues has proceeded on
two levels. One has been the citizen level, exemplified by the
conservation movement of the early Twentieth Century and the
environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s. The other has
been the research and policymaking level, exemplified by efforts to
assess benefits and costs of alternative strategies for improving the
quality of the environment. The two levels are closely related, but
since specific threats to the environment and citizen action are well
covered in the press and are daily brought to public attention, the
emphasis below is on some of the conceptual issues that underline
efforts to cope with the special problems posed by the environment.
When Markets Fail
When markets do not work, the distinctive aspect of environmental policy can be illuminated by contrasting environmental goods-clean air, clean water, wilderness, and so on
- with goods that are ordinarily exchanged in the market place.
Taking an economist's point of view, the competitive market
provides the ideal way for determining what shall be produced,
how goods and services will be produced, and how they will be
distributed. It provides for the expression of individual preferences
in jobs and in the choice of goods and services to buy. It gives
producers incentives and flexibility in meeting the demand. Some
markets work better than others, and, unfortunately, few work as
well as the economists' models postulate. But, by and large, they
work well enough in the United States to permit a predominantly
free economy. Where they work badly, government has stepped in
with regulations or with the direct provision of services.
Among crucial omissions from market transactions are the
so-called common property resources, such as the air, rivers,
oceans, and scenic wilderness areas. Most of these resources
belong to all collectively; they are not readily divisible, and so they
are shared. They do not enter into market transactions.
For a long time, they were commonly regarded as free goods.
As long as there was enough for everyone-even though water and
air were essential for life- their abundance meant they generally
went unpriced. Further, so long as the population was too small to
make heavy demands on the supply of air and water, natural
processes easily took care of pollution arising from human habita-
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Regulations vs. Incentives: the Legislative R ecord
By and large , two types of intervention have been considered
by policy makers. One is the enactment of standards: either an
effluent standard, or a limitation on how much of a particular
pollutant can be discharged into water or the air, or an ambient
standard , requiring that in a given area the water or air must be
maintained at a certain quality. The other :wproach is the use of
incentives to encourage polluters to alter their production processes or treat their effluents to minimize the destructive effects
and to include these costs in the price of the product. The first
governmental intervention relied entirely on the regulatory approach of standards, supplemented by subsidies for waste treatment ; but in recent years shortcomings of the direct regulatory
approach have led to an increasing interest in developing incentives that would require less policing and that might utilize market

forces to help bring about compliance.
Some of the major legislative efforts to protect the environment are described below.
1. Several acts have been passed during the past thirty years
to improve water quality, beginning with the Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 which gave the federal government
authority to conduct research on the problem. The Act was
amended in 1956 to provide federal grants for municipal
water treatment plants. Further amendments in 1972 increased funds for municipal waste treatment plants and
provided for federal effluent limits for different sources of
pollution, including issuance of discharge permits for industrial and municipal plants that meet the standards. The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began issuing
guidelines defining the pollution allowable for each industry after July 1977 (under the criterion of " the best practicable control technology ") and a higher standard, "best available technology," to be achieved by 1983. Two-thirds of
industrial dischargers and half of the municipalities met the
1977 standards and were issued permits. For the others,
EPA tried to work out a flexible approach where there was
evidence of a good-faith effort to meet the deadline. Provision also was made for exceptions, such as exemption of
Ohio's Mahoning Valley steel plants from national standards because of EPA's fear that enforcement of the abate-
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monitor environmental change and to advise the president
on environmental problems . NEPA also provides for the
preparation of environmental impact statements by all federal agencies whenever any of their actions may have significant impact on the environment.
Although it is perhaps too early to assess the impact of
this panopoly of legislation, some persistent critics have
been skeptical from the outset that much can be achieved
by this regulatory approach. They point to the failure of
other regulatory programs (in transportation particularly)
drawing attention to the possibilities of delaying enforcement through court action, difficulties of setting standards
and monitoring performance. They think the approach is
ineffective and costly. Defenders of the legislation of the
1970s concede imperfections, but insist that the regulatory
approach taken was the only feasible way to start an environmental protection program. Some support the efforts
of the critics of regulation to introduce a system of charges
and other incentives to supplement the regulations .

Rationale for Charges
The so-called "charges " approach stems from economic
analysis. Schultze and Kneese point out in Pollution, Prices, and
Public Policy a number of economic lessons that suggest the usefulness of economic incentives. These include:
I. The cost of removing additional units of pollutan~ from
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substitutes or made it possible to utilize ores or materials of lower
quality.
A highly influential study in the early 1960s -Scarcity and
Growth by Harold Barnett and Chandler Morse - pointed to the
fact that despite greatly increased use of natural resources, price
patterns over nearly a century indicated that prices for resource
commodities were generally declining. If a shortage was developing, or was even visible on the distant horizon, they argued, prices
would have been climbing. Historical experience and faith in continued technological advance combined to nurture an optimistic
view of the adequacy of resources.

The Changing Energy Picture
Nevertheless, during the past two decades , a number of
?bservers were becoming increasingly conc~rned about the rate of
mcrease in the use of the world's energy resources . Energ~ useparticularly in the form of petroleum-was not only growing _and
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such as Japan and Germany but it was also growing at an m~reasi~g
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sharply. Nevertheless, after the embargo was lifted and memories
of the gas shortage faded, public concern with an energy problem
also faded rapidly. Although the determinants of the long-run energy problem remained what they were before the embargo, United
States consumption and import of oil, after briefly leveling off,
started moving upward again. By 1979 and 1980, however, the
sharp increases in the retail price of gasoline began to exert significant restraint on consumption. Americans bought smaller cars and
drove less. Adjustment to the new energy reality was in progress.
How dependent the United States is on foreign sources of
essential resources has not been widely appreciated by the general
public. Facts were slow to make inroads on the myth of American
abundance until the oil embargo. There were occasional charges of
American profligacy- a nation with six percent of the world's
population was using thirty percent of the world's resources. This
statement, or a variation on it, appeared periodically in public
discussions. But the full implication of American dependence on
the rest of the world was not appreciated. The United States is
dependent on foreign sources for 90 to 100 percent of its supply of
chromium, titanium, manganese, cobalt, mica, columbium, and
strontium. It supplies more than half of its needs for only relatively
few materials, including, fortunately, iron, petroleum, lead, copper, and salt. But even here, the supplementary foreign sources of
supply are not firmly secure.
In the best of all possible worlds, policy makers could look to
foreign trade to supply the United States with materials in exchange for food and manufactured goods. But in the real world,
excessive dependence on foreign supplies can be risky - especially dependence on foreign sources for a commodity as essential
as petroleum. One of the nation's first reactions to the OPEC
embargo was to proclaim Project Independence that would make
the nation secure against disruption of its energy supply by 1985.
The slogan of "independence" faded as soon as the impracticality
of the approach began to be appreciated. The possibilities of other
~ltematives began to be recognized, such as the possibility of
mcreasingly interdependent relations with OPEC.
One response to our altered circumstances has been a rising
interest in more efficient use of resources. The word •• conservation" has returned to prominence in public discussions - with a
somewhat different meaning than it had during the conservation
movement of the early twentieth century. Then it was aimed largely
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at the saving of trees and scenic lands, and later at soil conservation
when, during the 1930s, dust storms posed a threat to western
farmlands. The focus of conservation today is on energy.
Conservation is one tool for reducing the vast drain on resources. It can be important both in the short run and the long run,
but its potential is limited. No precise estimates are available on the
savings from such measures as encouraging installation of better
insulation in homes and other buildings, adjusting thermostats so
that buildings do not use as much heat in winter and air conditioning in summer, improving efficiency of home appliances, reducing
automobile speeds, switching to smaller cars, and promoting
greater use of mass transit.
'Iransportation is a sector that has drawn particular attention.
It accounts for more than half of American consumption of petroleum and a fourth of total energy consumption. By contrast, most
other advanced nations_ which are smaller geographically and
have better developed public transportation systems - devote
only about an eighth of total energy to transportation. Part of this
difference is attributable to high gasoline taxes (which have made
gasoline two to three times more expensive abroad than in the
United States). The production of smaller cars with greater fuel
economy has thus been encouraged abroad.
But one can hardly look at the energy conservation potential
of the transport sector without taking a broader view of transportation as a major component of the nation's economic activity. The
manufacturing of transport equipment, the trucking and rail industries, etc., provide nearly four million jobs. In the public sector,
spending for highways ranks second to education, and taxes on
motor fuel and vehicles are important sources of revenue. Public
policies to promote transportation date back to early years in
American history, with expenditures for canals, and have continued with grants of land for railroads, subsidies for airlines, and
establishment of the Highway lhist Fund with its enormous impact
on road development across the country. The federal government's
first regulatory commission was the Interstate Commerce Commission, which still plays a major (and highly controversial) role in
economic affairs, along with the Civil Aeronautics Board. In the
field of public finance, questions about how to manage transport
expenditures have generated considerable debate. (For a discussion of user charges vs. general revenues and related issues, see
Groves and Bish, Financing Government, pp. 239-53.)
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The transport sector also provides one of the major challenges
to environmental management. The automobile, as a source of
carbon monoxide and other pollutants, has been a major target of
environmental regulation. (See Garvey, Energy, Ecology, Economy, Chapter 6, especially pp. 116-20.)
,
In short, transportation exemplifies the interrelationships of
the three central themes of this chapter. The Federal Energy Administration study, The National Energy Outlook, estimates that
higher prices and conservation measures could reduce the rate of
growth in energy consumption from 3.6 percent a year (the average
rate for 1977) to 2.2 percent. Given the growth rate of the nation,
such savings serve primarily to buy time in which to develop new
sources of supply, to make headway in the slowing down of population growth, to begin thinking about changing some growth incentives in governmental policy, and perhaps even to change life styles
away from the emphasis on consumption of material goods.
While conservation is widely endorsed as a policy that can
make a useful contribution over the next few years, there is less
t?an universal agreement on specific policies to achieve a reduction in consumption and the precise objectives of conservation
Policies. Conservation could be promoted, for example, by decontrolling (and hence, presumably, raising) gas and oil prices, so that
consumers would have a financial incentive to use less gas and oil.
But such a policy could well have side effects that are highly
ob~ectionable - the inflationary impact of diffusion of higher oil
Pnces through the economy, the depressing impact on business
activity, windfall profits to some energy producers and distributors, and inequality of the burdens. Discussion of these matters
Will be of public concern for some time.
Alternative Energy Sources
For the long run, the focus is on research that will lead to a
source of energy that might be as cheap and plentiful as oil once
Was-with a minimal threat to the environment. One such source is
solar energy, which is abundant enough, but which has not yet been
harnessed in a way that makes it commercially feasible on a large
scale. In selected instances it is being used in home heating and
cooling, and this may prove to be its most promising use in the near
future. Considerable research is under way to determine more
effective ways to generate electricity from the sun. The prospect of
continuing increases in oil prices reduces the time before solar
energy becomes competitive with oil.
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Another potential energy source for the distant future is fusion, a process that obtains energy from water. This source also
looks desirable on resource and environmental grounds, but its
feasibility is still not proved. Even if scientists succeed in demonstrating a practical method of fusion power in the next few years, it
will be well into the twenty-first century before fusion power plants
can be put into operation. The essential difference between solar
power and fusion is that the feasibility of solar power has been
demonstrated. It has been used for heating and in solar batteries.
Its practicality for some uses is within reach. Fusion is unproved.
For the near term - between our present situation and the
long-run hope for power from the sun and water-we will continue
to be highly dependent on oil, with coal and possibly nuclear power
playing a greater role. Coal is plentiful, but poses hazards. Strip
mining degrades the land, underground mining is a hazardous
occupation, and the burning of coal contributes to air pollution.
This is an especially serious matter in the Southwest and in the
states of Montana and Wyoming where exceptionally rich coal
veins lie. The local communities also are concerned about boomtown development if the nation seeks to augment its coal supply
from these sources. (Gerald Garvey's book, Energy, Ecology,
Economy analyzes the energy-ecology tradeoff).
Nuclear technology has been proved, and about 100 nuclear
plants are in operation. Collectively they produce over 8 percent of
the nation's electricity and could produce 26 percent by 1985. But
the costs of construction have mounted greatly, so that the apparent economic advantages have largely been eroded, and reliability
of the plants has been less than expected. At the same time,
development of nuclear power has been hampered by public concerns over thermal pollution and radiation leaks, possibility of a
nuclear disaster, (dramatically emphasized by the Three-mile Island accident) need for safe and lasting procedures for handling and
disposing of radioactive wastes, and fears of nuclear theft and
proliferation of nuclear weapons to irresponsible governments,
particularly if the breeder reactor is developed. Several efforts by
state referenda to pass laws that would place severe restrictions on
nuclear construction were defeated in 1976. Nevertheless, there
was sufficient public opposition to discourage power companies
and induce them to cut back on their plans to construct nuclear
plants. Thus, there is much doubt of the former FEA's projection
that nuclear power will supply 26 percent of electricity needs by
1985.
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ernment moved toward improving the administration of energy
policies through reorganization of scattered energy activities into a
single Department of Energy, which was established October I,
1977.
Recommendations for energy policy run into goals of other
public policies . For example , enthusiasm for switching from oil, an
increasingly scarce resource, to coal, a very abundant one, is
dampened by concerns about the environmental costs of a major
increase in coal production and consumption. And pr~posals t?
enact taxes on gas-guzzling cars have raised concerns m Detroit
about loss ofjobs . Proposals to increase gasoline taxes and there~y
dampe n consumption are cha llenged by concerns for t~ose m
middle and lower income groups who are dependent on the1r a utomobiles .
And so we return to the world of tradeoffs-hoping that policy"
choices will be governed , at leas t in part, by a rational establishment of goals and a rational consideration of the benefits and costs
of alternative courses of actio n.
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for it. Identify a lternative approaches for dealing with the
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